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dc.contributor.authorLin, Chung-Chengen_US
dc.contributor.authorYang, C. C.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-08T15:19:51Z-
dc.date.available2014-12-08T15:19:51Z-
dc.date.issued2010-12-01en_US
dc.identifier.issn0164-0704en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2010.07.002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11536/14076-
dc.description.abstractThe employment relationship is to a large extent characterized by incomplete contracts, in which workers have a considerable degree of discretion over the choice of their work effort. This discretion at work kicks in the potential importance of "gift exchange" or reciprocity between workers and employers in their employment relationship. Built on the seminal work of Akerlof (1980), this paper adopts a social norm approach to model reciprocity in labor markets and theoretically derives two versions of downward wage rigidity. The first version explains why employers may adopt a high wage policy far above the competitive level. This version is not a novel finding in the existing literature and is mainly served as a benchmark for later comparison in the current paper. Our main contribution lies in the second version in which not only may employers adopt a high wage policy far above the competitive level, but one can also account for the asymmetric behavior of wages and explain why employers are hesitant about wage cuts in the presence of negative shocks. We argue that this second and stronger version of downward wage rigidity has moved the efficiency wage theory a step forward. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectReciprocityen_US
dc.subjectDownward wage rigidityen_US
dc.subjectSocial normen_US
dc.subjectEfficiency wageen_US
dc.titleReciprocity and downward wage rigidityen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jmacro.2010.07.002en_US
dc.identifier.journalJOURNAL OF MACROECONOMICSen_US
dc.citation.volume32en_US
dc.citation.issue4en_US
dc.citation.spage1155en_US
dc.citation.epage1168en_US
dc.contributor.department經營管理研究所zh_TW
dc.contributor.departmentInstitute of Business and Managementen_US
dc.identifier.wosnumberWOS:000284299600017-
dc.citation.woscount0-
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