內部債和審慎與現金持有的關係

Abstract

過去的文獻證實給予經理人內部債能夠有效地降低債的代理成本，於是有關內部債的議題開始盛行。在本篇論文中，我們著重於僅包含公司權益和內部債的薪資結構與經理人審慎對公司現金持有以及計畫選擇和最佳薪資的影響為何。利基於Edmans和Liu(2010) 之模型，我們藉由逆向歸納法找出最適解。結果顯示若經理人是風險厭惡和審慎的,隨著違約風險增加，資產替代效果變得更顯著。然而，當違約風險增加，內部債可能增加也可能減少。此外，我們也發現在這情況下最佳薪資是權益比例大於內部債的比例。

Previous studies demonstrated that the use of inside debt in managerial compensation is an efficient solution to alleviate the agency costs of debt, and thus the issue on inside debt began prevalent. In this paper, we focus on the effect of compensation containing equity and inside debt and the manager’s prudence on the decisions of cash holdings and project selection, and optimal compensation. Based on Edmans and Liu (2010) and we derive the optimal solution by backward induction. Our results show that if the manager is risk-averse and prudent. The asset substitution effect is more significant as default risk increases. However, inside debt may increase or decreases when the default risk intensifies. Furthermore, we also find that the optimal compensation is an equity bias under this situation, that is, the proportion of equity is larger than inside debt.