中國公司赴美上市採取雙重股權的決定因素探討

Abstract

在中國公司赴美IPO（首次公開發行）的浪潮中，以百度爲開端的一系列公司相繼採取雙重股權（dual-class share structure）的形式，將公司的控制權牢牢鎖定在公司內部人手中。這已經成爲一種現象級的事件。文章從觀察這種現象入手，試圖提出三點可能導致中國公司選取雙重股權上市的因素，在三種影響因素的背景下提出了三種假設情境： 在 “與外部股東溝通成本過高”的因素下，實證結果表明雙重股權公司的IPO可能是爲了未來的長期投資項目，而由于外部股東的短視，只能自己掌握住控制權之後保證R&D費用的投入來推動長遠的投資項目。在“分散自身的財富風險”的因素下，沒有找到證據證實創始人使用雙重股權結構是為了保持住控制權的同時，出讓現金流量權來分散資產在公司特有層面上的風險。在“創始人影響力”的因素下，證實了創始人與公司的聯繫越緊密，影響力越大，就越有可能掌握公司的控制權。

In the tide of Chinese company IPO in the US, a lot of companies’ IPO use the dual-class structure in the beginning of BAIDU, which helping the insiders grasping the absolute control firmly. This has become a phenomenon. This paper starts from observing the phenomenon, trying to put forward three factors that may leading the dual-class structure appearance in Chinese companies IPOs frequently. According to the three factors, we propose three hypotheses as follows: The empirical result of first factor shows that the rationale ——the purpose of IPO is to raise fund for investing the long-term projects in the future, when the value of these projects is difficult or expensive to communicate to outside shareholders. So it’s necessary to retain founder’s control to ensure the realization of the investments——is acceptable. Under the second factor, no evidence shows that the reason of choosing dual-class structure is a founder has the desire for control and diversify the risk of his own wealth or investments at the same time. Under the third rationale, we first quantized the variable of “the founder’s influence”. The more close a founder’s personal image connected with the company——the more influence the founder has——the more possibility for the founder to hold the control.