權益型薪酬制度與併購行為

Abstract

公司治理一直是近年來監管機關、企業組織強調的重點，隨著獨立董事的設立，負責制定CEO薪酬的薪酬委員會重要性也日漸增加。本篇論文即在探討權益型薪酬制度相對於CEO自身財富與公司投資決策的關係。本論文取兩份樣本，一份為併購組資料，取1994-2014年間有做併購的公司資料，另一份樣本則為對照組，與併購組資料的產業、資產規模相近卻沒有做併購的公司樣本，從中探討CEO的誘因比率、CEO年紀、併購與否等變數的交互作用如何影響公司併購後的額外報酬率、資本支出、營收成長率。以及進一步探討併購組資料，將此份資料再分成積極併購者與消極併購者，加深分析併購多次與併購一次的影響因素，及併購完後CEO對於公司報酬率及投資決策的影響。

Corporate governance has been always improved by supervisory authority and shareholder’s committee. Compensation committee which is responsible for CEO’s compensation is more important day by day. The thesis is talking about the relationship between CEO with equity-based compensation and the investment strategy after acquisition. We took two different samples, one is the merged data which is between 1994-2014 year, and the other is compared data which is same industry and similar asset size compared to merged data and without doing acquisition. We analyzed CEO’s incentive ratio, age, acquisition to determine how these variables affected company’s abnormal return, capital expenditure, sales growth rate. Furthermore, we separated the merged data into positive acquirer and passive acquirer. We analyzed the factor which made these data different and investigated these variables affect CEO’s investment strategy.