查核會計師的合法與專家權力重要嗎？財務風險客戶與審計品質觀點

Abstract

本文旨在探討會計師擁有權力是否會影響其風險態度，並反映在接受有財務風險客戶之委任及其審計品質上。擁有合法權力之會計師可能傾向將注意力集中於正向與酬賞的資訊，因此較注重風險行動中的回報，而忽視其潛在危險；或者，具備合法權力之會計師也可能更加注重聲譽維護，擔心高財務風險客戶之企業失敗使其需承擔可能發生之審計失敗與訴訟風險。再者，由於產業專家擁有較佳之查核品質，故若當會計師同時具備合法及專家權力時，對於高財務風險客戶之委任選擇及其審計品質，應存在一定程度之影響。實證結果發現當主簽或副簽會計師具備合法權力時，較不願意接受高財務風險客戶之委任；然而當主簽會計師同時擁有合法及專家權力時，則較會願意承擔高財務風險客戶之查核責任。在對裁決性應計數之結果上，發現具合法權力之主簽會計師查核的高財務風險公司較會進行盈餘向下之管理行為，惟當主簽會計師同時具備合法權力及產業專家身分時，則會遏制高財務風險公司進行盈餘向下之操弄，會有較高之審計品質。綜上可知，會計師之合法權力及產業專家身分，實為影響其接受高財務風險客戶委任及其審計品質之重要因素。就作者所知，本文為目前第一篇同時探討會計師合法及專家權力之實證文章。希冀透過本文結果，能補足會計師特性對於客戶委任選擇及審計品質影響文獻之闕漏，也企圖從不同面相的觀察，發現影響會計師委任偏好與其審計品質之關鍵因素。

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether power of audit partners is reflected in the composition of their client portfolios and audit quality. Audit partners with legitimate power tend to focus optimistically on the potential rewards. This makes them more likely to attach importance to potential returns from risk-related actions, thereby accepting clients with greater financial risk. Alternatively, audit partners with legitime power may be more concerned with reputation preservation, fearing that the business failure of a high financial risk client exposes him or her to the risk of possible audit failure and litigation. Furthermore, because auditor industry expertise has better audit quality, there should be some impact on the client selection and audit quality of high financial risk clients when audit partners have both legitimate and expert powers. The findings show that lead or concurring partners with legitimate power are inclined towards risk aversion in their client choice. Lead partners with both legitimate and expert powers tend to accept clients with higher financial risk. Moreover, clients with high financial risk that are audited by lead partners with legitimate power are inclined to permit the downward earnings management. Audit partners with both legitimate power and expert power provide higher audit quality. In summary, audit partners with legitimate power and expert power are important factors affecting their acceptance of appointments of high financial risk clients and their audit quality. This paper is the first empirical article exploring audit partners' legitimate power and expert power. Through the results of this paper, we hope to fill in the gaps in the literature on the influence of audit partner characteristics on the preference of client selection and audit quality.