中國輪調指派制度對審計品質之影響－以中國中央企業為例

Abstract

國務院國有資產監督管理委員會發布國資發評價[2004]173號《關於印發【中央企業財務決算審計工作規則】的通知》，規定中央企業的會計師事務所必須每五年進行輪調。綜觀過去關於事務所輪調的實證研究結果，發現對於審計品質的影響沒有定論。而強制性的輪調制度對審計品質是否有提升的效果，更有待進一步確認。本研究期間為2005年至2010年，以中國A股中央企業為樣本，採用logistic模型檢驗實驗變數的顯著性。實證結果發現，中國央企的強制事務所輪調制度，只有在前一任會計師事務所超過輪調年限時，才有顯著提升審計品質的效果。另一方面，中國央企的事務所指派制度，對有審計品質的影響並不顯著。

The Stated-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council requires that central government-owned enterprises should have their audit firms rotated every five years, which is regulated in “Notifications about Publishing Audit Rules for Financial Final Accounts of Central Government-owned Enterprises” in the State-Owned Assets Development Valuation, 2004, No.173. In past studies, the impact of audit firm rotation and individual accountant rotation on audit quality is ambiguous, and whether mandatory rotation can improve audit quality is still a further issue left for discussion. In this study, we collect samples of central government-owned enterprises of China which have issued A-share, with a sample period ranging from 2005 to 2010. We apply logistic model in examining the significance of the experimental variables. The results are that only when the former audit firm exceeds the limited rotation years will the mandatory firm rotation of central government-owned enterprises improve audit quality, and that China’s assigning specific audit firms to central government-owned enterprises does not pose significant impact on the enterprises’ audit quality.