中國股權分置改革與國有企業改革對企業會計師選任的影響

Abstract

中國採行計畫經濟，多數企業為國有企業，國有企業經理人較不關心公司股價，也缺乏誘因聘任高品質會計師。另一方面，中國次級市場成立時，政府為了保全國有資產，將公司股份區分為流通股與非流通股，是謂「股權分置制度」。流通股約僅佔三成，由於只有流通股可在次級市場買賣，上市公司股價與持有非流通股的大股東(經理人)之財富無直接關連，也使中國上市公司缺乏聘任高品質會計師的誘因。傳統理論分析企業對於高品質會計師的需求時，主要以民營公司、股權可自由流通為前提進行討論。但是中國資本市場的特色，使中國多數企業偏好聘請規模較小的事務所進行審計。 本計畫第一年擬分析中國股權分置改革後，流通股比率增加，股價與大股東(經理人)財富產生直接關連後，是否提高企業聘任高品質會計師的動機。同時分析是否在流通股比率較高的公司，高品質會計師才對企業盈餘與股價的關連性有顯著正向影響。本計畫第二年擬分析中國國有股減持政策，使許多國有企業民營化後，企業是否在會計師選任的決策上有所不同。同時探討會計師是否會對於民營化後的公司，收取較高的公費。本計畫擬透過中國獨特之市場特性，企圖驗證過去對於會計師需求的理論，有助於會計師選任以及國有企業相關文獻之累積。同時，透過本計畫可以讓我們對中國資本市場有更多的瞭解，對實務有所貢獻。

Chinese capital market has a number of unique characteristics which influence company’s choice of auditor. First, a lot of listed firms are state-owned enterprise (SOE). The manager of SOE may care state’s policy more than the stock price of the company, and has less incentive to hire high quality auditor. Second, there are tradable and non-tradable shares in the same company, and only tradable shares can be traded in stock market. Most controlling shareholders (managers) own non-tradable shares, so the market price of the tradable shares is of less interest to them. Therefore, the controlling shareholders (managers) are less concerned about the quality of accounting information and the quality of the auditors. This 2-year research proposal attempts to have a comprehensive examination on the auditor choice issue in China. In the first year, this research will examine whether percentage of tradable shares has impact on company’s auditor choice decision. In the second year, this research will focus on the privatization of Chinese SOE. This research will analyze the auditor choice in privatized firms especially. China provides an interesting setting for examining auditor choice issue. Focusing on China market, this study contributes to auditing literature and can help us understand the Chinese capital market.