股改前後管理者持股對公司投資行為之影響 ─以上海A股公司為例

Abstract

投資是公司尋求事業成長的驅動力，由於現實世界並非完美效率市場，使得公司投資決策與MM理論不一致，特別是新興市場的上市公司因為政府干預因素，使其投資行為更為複雜多變。以中國市場而言，2005年前因為存在獨特的股權分置制度，使流通股與非流通股股東產生利益不一致的情況，影響資本市場發展及公司治理機制，2005年後，中國政府開始推行改革政策期望導正過去因制度所造成的缺陷。 中國市場的政策轉變恰巧可以提供我們從政府干預的背景了解公司投資行為變化的案例，並且從代理問題的角度對公司投資行為的轉變進行分析，了解股改是否有助於緩解管理者的代理問題，優化公司治理機制。實證結果發現，在全樣本的迴歸式中，股改後投資支出與投資機會呈現顯著正相關，此外股改後SOE公司在管理者持有股份的情況下，會促使投資支出─投資機會之間的敏感度增加，而NON-SOE公司在股改後，其投資支出與投資機會呈現顯著正相關，無論管理階層持股與否，皆不影響公司投資行為。整體而言，從投資行為可以看出，SOE管理者在持有股份的誘因下，對把握投資機會進行投資支出的態度更加積極，而NON-SOE公司的管理者對公司的經營更加自律，較股改前具備更濃厚的專業經理人色彩，更重視公司價值提升。本研究的結果提供了政策性干預影響公司投資行為的佐證，也間接印證了股權分置改革可優化公司治理的論點。

Investment provides the motive power of a company’s expansion. However, the literature has long recognized that companies’ investment decisions deviate from MM theory due to frictions in the real world. The companies’ investment behavior in the emerging market is particularly complicated because of government intervention. Take the Chinese market for example, a strategy of share division of listed companies before 2005 caused the interest conflict between tradable stockholders and non-tradable stockholders, even spoiled the development of capital market and lowered the quality of corporate governance. The influence was so enormous that the Chinese government implemented the split share structure reform in 2005, hoping to modify the defect of the share division strategy. Our analysis, based on the background of reform and companies’ investment behavior, confirms that the split share structure reform could mitigate the agency problem arising from interest conflict. First, we discover the significantly positive relation between investment expenditure and investment opportunities after the split share structure reform, while it was not significant in post-reform samples. Second, we find that the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities is significantly higher for those SOE companies whose directors participate in the ownership after the reform, while it was not significant in post-reform samples. In NON-SOE samples, regardless of the directors’ ownership, the investment expenditure only has significantly positive relation with firms’ investment opportunities after the reform. Taken together, this study suggests that firms’ investment behavior has a lot to do with government intervention, and the split share structure reform would urge the Chinese listed companies’ directors to execute their investment decision on the base of firms’ investment opportunities.