标题: Does the release of corporate governance evaluation information decrease information asymmetry? Evidence from Taiwan
宣告公司治理评鉴资讯会降低资讯不对称吗?以台湾为例
作者: Yi-Hui Tai
关键字: 公司治理排名;评鉴;资讯不对称;台湾;Corporate governance ranking;evaluation;information asymmetry;Taiwan
公开日期: 十二月-2021
出版社: 国立阳明交通大学 经营管理研究所
Institute of Business and Magement, National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University
摘要: 本文以台湾公司治理评鉴制度为研究标的,探讨宣告公司治理评鉴资讯是否可以降低资讯不对称。本文根据过去文献,以股市的股票买卖价差做为衡量资讯不对称的代理变数,并控制其他非资讯不对称的相关变数。实证证据显示平均而言,股市的股票买卖价差在宣告日及宣告日前一天都会减少1%。本文也进行长窗期的检测,实证结果发现对于宣告日前四天至宣告后两天的期间来说,公司治理评鉴资讯会降低资讯不对称,然而,当本研究使用交易量作为资讯不对称的代理变数时,并没有发现前述结果。本研究也进一步测试投资人的预期行为及公司治理评鉴结果的状态是否会影响资讯不对称,结果发现不论前一期公司的 EPS 是正数或负数,抑或是公司治理评鉴状态是升等、降等或是不变,宣告公司治理评鉴资讯造成资讯不对称下降情况仍存在。最后,本文实证结果可以作为立法者、公司管理阶层及整个股市参考之用。
This research takes Taiwan’s corporate governance evaluation exercises as the subject to investigate whether releasing their rankings decreases information asymmetry. I follow prior studies and focus on the stock market’s bid-ask spread as a measure of information asymmetry, while controlling for its non-information asymmetry-related components. Evidence herein demonstrates that, on average, the bid-ask spread decreases by approximately 1% on the announcement date of corporate governance evaluation rankings as well as one day before the announcement. I also explore long-window effects, documenting results that releasing corporate governance evaluation rankings does decrease information asymmetry over the four days prior to the announcement and two days after the announcement, but I do not find consistent results when I employ the number of transactions as an alternative measure of information asymmetry. I further examine whether investors’ predictable behavior and the status of corporate governance evaluation results influence information asymmetry, offering findings that information asymmetry really diminishes no matter whether the firm’s EPS in the previous period is positive or negative and whether the status of CG evaluation is upgrade, downgrade, or no change. Lastly, I highlight the empirical findings’ implications for regulatory agencies, corporate management, and the overall capital market.
URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3966/102873102021124102004
https://ibm.nycu.edu.tw/ibm/cmr/2021_Issue2/2021_Issue2.html
http://hdl.handle.net/11536/159299
ISSN: 1028-7310
DOI: 10.3966/102873102021124102004
期刊: 交大管理学报
Corporate Mangement Review
Chiao Da Mangement Review
Volume: 41
Issue: 2
起始页: 129
结束页: 166
显示于类别:Chiao Da Mangement Review


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