會計穩健性與股價崩盤風險

Abstract

本研究主要控制公司治理機制下探討會計穩健性對股價崩盤風險的影響,並檢驗資訊不對稱是否對於會計穩健性與股價崩盤風險的關係具有調節效果。本文以台灣上市公司 2009年至 2018 年之資料進行實證研究,實證結果顯示條件穩健性愈高的公司,未來股價崩盤風險較低,顯示會計穩健性可限制管理者誇大業績與向投資者隱瞞壞消息的動機與能力,進而降低股價崩盤風險。此外,在資訊不對稱性程度愈高的公司,條件穩健性相較其他公司治理機制更能降低未來股價崩盤風險,支持替代關係假說。

This paper examines the impact of accounting conservatism for stock price crash risk. Moreover, we further discuss whether information asymmetry has the moderating effect between accounting conservatism and stock price crash risk. The sample contains the listed companies from Taiwan over the period 2009 to 2018. The empirical results show that conditional conservatism has a negative impact on future stock price crashes. This paper provides empirical evidence by conditional conservatism limits managers’ incentive and ability to overstate performance and hide bad news from investors, thereby reducing the risk of stock price crashes. Moreover, we find that the relationship between conservatism and future price crash risk is more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry compared to other corporate governance mechanisms. This result supports the hypothesis of substitute relation between conservatism and corporate governance.