標題: Analyzing online B2B exchange markets: Asymmetric cost and incomplete information
作者: Li, Yung-Ming
Jhang-Li, Jhih-Hua
資訊管理與財務金融系 註:原資管所+財金所
Department of Information Management and Finance
關鍵字: Auctions;Economics;Game theory;Online exchanges;Supplier competition
公開日期: 1-十一月-2011
摘要: This research applies the discriminating auction to analyze the online B2B exchange market in which a single buyer requests multiple items and several suppliers having equal capacity and asymmetric cost submit bids to compete for buyer demand. In the present model, we examine the impact of asymmetric cost and incomplete information on the participants in the market. Given the complete cost information, each supplier randomizes its price and the lower bound of the price range is determined by the highest marginal cost. In addition, the supplier with a lower marginal cost has a larger considered pricing space but ultimately has a smaller equilibrium one than others with higher marginal costs. When each supplier's marginal cost is private information, the lowest possible price is determined by the number of suppliers and the buyer's reservation price. Comparing these two market settings, we find whether IT is beneficial to buyers or suppliers depends on the scale of the bid process and the highest marginal cost. When the number of suppliers and the difference between the highest marginal cost and the buyer's reservation price are sufficiently large, each supplier can gain a higher profit if the marginal costs are private information. On the contrary, when the highest marginal cost approaches the buyer's reservation price, complete cost information benefits the suppliers. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.05.025
http://hdl.handle.net/11536/18551
ISSN: 0377-2217
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2011.05.025
期刊: EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
Volume: 214
Issue: 3
起始頁: 722
結束頁: 731
顯示於類別:期刊論文


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