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dc.contributor.authorTzeng, WGen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-08T15:45:53Z-
dc.date.available2014-12-08T15:45:53Z-
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.identifier.isbn3-540-66967-1en_US
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11536/30848-
dc.description.abstractWhen a group of people wants to communicate securely over an open network, they run a conference-key protocol to establish a common conference key K such that all their communications thereafter are encrypted with the key K. In this paper we propose a practical and provably secure fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol under the authenticated broadcast channel model. The adversary that attacks our protocol can be either active or passive. An active adversary (malicious participant) tries to disrupt establishment of a common conference key among the honest participants, while a passive adversary tries to learn the conference key by listening to the communication of participants. We show that a passive adversary gets no information (zero knowledge) about the conference key established by the honest participants under the assumption of a variant Diffie-Hellman decision problem. We also show that the honest participants can agree on a common conference key no matter how many participants are malicious.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.titleA practical and secure fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocolen_US
dc.typeArticle; Proceedings Paperen_US
dc.identifier.journalPUBLIC KEY CRYTOGRAPHYen_US
dc.citation.volume1751en_US
dc.citation.spage1en_US
dc.citation.epage13en_US
dc.contributor.department資訊工程學系zh_TW
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Computer Scienceen_US
dc.identifier.wosnumberWOS:000165144300001-
Appears in Collections:Conferences Paper