負債契約條款違約公司長期績效與盈餘管理之關聯

Abstract

企業舉債時，投資者或債權人通常會要求債券契約上加註一些限制條款（Restrictive Covenants），契約條款的存在是為了保障債權人的權益，無論債務人是否依約如期支付本金跟利息，條款被牴觸時債務人有權採取必要措施以保全債權。盈餘管理係指管理當局運用某些方法或程序，使會計盈餘達到其預定之目標。 財務上，我們關心一個事件發生後對投資價值的影響，在本研究中我們將負債契約條款違約公司在違約發生後的營運、股票等事後績效連結盈餘管理議題，首先呼應前人研究發現負債契約條款違約公司在違約當年的顯著盈餘管理證據。並且發現違約後一年後出現抑制盈餘的現象。在股價績效與營運績效方面，我們歸結出相對於配對樣本、配對指數，負債契約條款違約公司呈現負的異常績效。而且，在事發當年度盈餘管理程度較高的公司，各項績效反而是更差的，亦即盈餘管理程度與事後績效呈反比。

As companies arrange their debt, no matter loans or bonds, the investors or the lender usually make some additional restrictive covenants that protect their right. When the borrowers default on these covenants, or when covenant violation happens, the lender has the authority to protect their right. This case happens whether the borrowers pay principle and interest on time or not. The earnings management means the managers choose judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to change the financial reports, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. In financial field, we do concern about how an event affect the investment value of a company. In this study we relate debt covenant violation, operational performance and stock performance. First of all, we find the evidence that covenant violation companies manipulate their earnings, which is support of literature. And we also observe an interesting situation that the DCA index of the year after covenant violation is minus. We conclude that compared to benchmark or matching firms, post performances of covenant violation companies in operation or stock are worse. Moreover, companies that manipulate earnings in the violation year perform worse. In other words, earnings management and post event performance are inverse related.