實證探討美國創投與創業家間資訊不對稱與相對談判優劣勢，對其融資工具選擇之影響

Abstract

過去的創投與創業家之融資契約的研究，多著重於學術理論部分的探討。創投投資者與創業家之間存在代理問題，有雙重道德風險、逆選擇等資訊不對稱現象。本研究檢視會計盈餘變動量、研發費用佔營收之比例、無形資產佔總資產之比例、生技產業等資訊不對稱的指標，與融資工具(債、可轉換債券、可轉換特別股、可轉換債券搭配可轉換特別股)選用之間的關係，旨在實證探討創投投資者與創業家融資工具的選用，是否和資訊不對稱及談判優劣勢具關聯性。研究結果顯示，在盈餘不穩定、無形資產比重較高企業，以及生技產業，多傾向使用債或可轉換債券做為融資工具，以抑制創業家盈餘操控的現象。

Prior studies of the financing contracts between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs most typically focus on analytical deduction. Specifically, they investigate agency settings with double moral hazard and/or adverse selection. In contrast, this study empirically tests the effect of information asymmetry and bargaining power on the choice among financing securities including debt, convertible debt, convertible preferred stock, and convertible debt plus convertible preferred stock. The proxy variables for moral hazard and/or adverse selection are volatility of earnings, percentage of research and development expense, percentage of intangible assets, and type of industry. Consistent with the notion that new venture firms adopt financing contracts to alleviate earnings manipulation and/or moral hazard, the results show that the companies with volatile earnings, high intangible assets, and firms in the biotechnology industry tend to issue more debt or convertible debt.