專利排他權之新思考：將獨立研發抗辯納入禁制令之審理

Abstract

現行專利制度下，獨立研發無法做為被告在專利侵權訴訟中之抗辯事由，導致獨立研發者在專利法之評價與仿冒者並無二致。獨立研發者必須付出研發成本卻無法實施自身開發之技術，致使獨立研發者在法律/經濟整體而言比仿冒者還糟。是以當一家公司發現其在技術開發上喪失（或可能喪失）領先地位時，最佳策略是放棄研發以避免重複研發之浪費，而非加緊研發以求迎頭趕上。本論文因而認為，現行專利制度鼓勵第二名以後之公司放棄研發，與專利制度鼓勵研發以促進科技進步之本質背道而馳。 為求貫徹專利法鼓勵研發之立法目的，本文主要研究目的之一在於建構一個法律體系，使得獨立研發者在法律/經濟整體上優於仿冒者，以鼓勵企業積極從事研發，無論其是否在研發上居於領先地位。本文由歷史面向、憲法面向、實證面向、及經濟面向之研究，指出在專利侵權糾紛中接受獨立研發抗辯是合理且可行的，且可達到讓獨立研發者在法律/經濟整體上優於仿冒者之研究目的。為期在保護專利排他權及鼓勵研發間取得平衡，本文更建議法院在審理暫時禁制令及永久禁制令時，將被告之獨立研發抗辯納入考量。本文指出，若被告可證明其所製造販賣之被控侵權品確實是自己獨立研發而得，法院在個案審酌暫時禁制令及永久禁制令之四個衡平因素時，都有不核發禁制令之考量空間。

As the independent invention is unacceptable under the current patent system, an independent developer is poorer than a free rider. Whenever a company finds that it has lost (or is likely to lose) the lead in technology development, the best policy for the company is to give up research activities to avoid wasteful duplication, rather than to catch up. This dissertation finds that it is absurd to establish a patent system to encourage a second-lead company to give up its research activities. One of the primary purposes of this dissertation is to suggest a system in which an independent developer will have a better position than a free rider, in order to encourage enterprises to continue to research and develop despite whether they take the lead in technology development. From different perspectives, including historical, constitutional, empirical, and economic, this dissertation finds that the independent invention defense is reasonable and worth being considered in patent-related disputes. To create the aforementioned system and to harmonize the measures of protecting patent rights with the purpose of promoting the progress of useful art, this dissertation suggests considering the independent invention defense in evaluating the four factors of preliminary injunction and permanent injunction proceedings as a mechanism to balance a patentee’s right to exclude and the public’s productive uses of science and technology.