超額現金持有，投資與公司價值：財務限制和管理者鞏固職位的調節效果

Abstract

本論文主要探討在不完美市場下，現金管理是否會影響公司投資？研究主要以兩個理論為基礎進而發展假說，並加以實證檢驗。從融資限制假說認為：公司若是外部融資成本較高，則持有超額現金會增加公司的投資需求(公司會有投資不足的情況)。從自由現金流量的假說認為：公司治理較差的公司在有超額現金的情況下，管理者傾向使用超額現金來投資一些會以股東利益為代價之淨現值為負的計畫 (公司會有超額投資的情況)。研究結果發現：這兩種假說均適合解釋台灣公司的超額現金使用。我們進一步將兩種假說放置在同一個模型中驗證，研究結果發現：外部融資成本較高的公司不僅會使用超額現金來增加投資，且當這些公司治理機制不佳時，管理者在能有較大的彈性處分這些超額現金時，更進而會使用更多的超額現金在增加投資支出，這也是我們研究台灣此一新興市場的發現。 我們在第二部分探討的是，在持有超額現金的情況下，考量財務融資限制和公司治理這兩個構面下，是否會影響公司市場價值及營運績效。研究結果發現：在治理機制較弱的公司中，若公司在融資限制的環境中，超額現金的使用會使公司下一期的市場價值增加較沒有融資限制的情況下多。 此外，若公司融資成本較低，則管理者在監督較不積極的環境中會有過度投資的行為。在持有超額現金與公司的營運績效的關聯性中，我們發現在考量財務限制與公司治理的調節效果下，兩者並沒有明顯的相關。

This dissertation aims to explore whether excess cash is related to investment expenditures and firm valuation in an imperfect market. Two lines of theory are tested in this research. The costly- external- financing theory documents that managers might not search for the optimal investment level and thus under-invest when facing higher financing costs. However, the free cash flow theory documents that managers also could not maintain the optimal investment level and thus over-invest when they are management entrenchment. Combined these two lines of theory, we try to find out how the most important liquidity assets in the firms, cash, is managed under these two circumstances. Our first essay investigates the relationship between excess cash holdings and investment behavior under two dimensions of financial constraints and managerial entrenchment, based upon a sample of Taiwanese firms operating in an environment characterized by poor legal protection for investors, with data covering the years 2000 to 2006. We find that excess cash is significantly correlated to total investment and capital expenditure, particularly for firms financially constrained and with severe managerial entrenchment. The evidence shows that excess cash is insensitive to R&D expenditure under these two dimensions. Our second essay examines the value of excess cash under two dimensions of financial constraints and managerial entrenchment. The results show that the stock performance of excess cash is higher for constrained firms versus unconstrained firms if these firms face higher managerial entrenchment or lower blockholdings. On the other side, we find that excess cash could be used to over-invest in value decreasing projects if there is less monitored by institutional blockholders in unconstrained firms. However, the financial constraints’ effect related to excess cash can not increase operating performance whether the firms are strong or poor governed when either managerial entrenchment or institutional blockholdings is measured as the proxy for corporate governance.