薪酬資訊揭露與公司價值

Abstract

本論文主要係探討董事與經理人之薪酬資訊在不同揭露透明度下的市場價值。在自我選擇的偏誤下，有較高董事獨立性的公司通常會傾向提供較完整的薪酬資訊揭露，進而降低代理問題，而台灣的主管機關提供了一個漸進執行的薪酬資訊揭露改革政策，所以針對是否要提供較高透明度之薪酬資訊的揭露要求，主管機關提供這些公司相當大的裁量選擇空間，因此，本研究可以利用此一自然實驗下的資料獨特性，來驗證不同薪酬揭露程度對公司價值的影響效果。

第一個研究議題係探討公司自願揭露完整的董事與經理人薪酬資訊是否會帶來較高的市場價值。實證結果指出，市場針對那些自願揭露完整薪酬資訊的公司反應出較高的市場價值，然而，對於那些使用大量權益為基礎之工具作為紅利發放的電子產業公司，其完整薪酬揭露的市場價值並不顯著，因為這樣以權益為基礎的紅利工具，外部投資人較無法衡量其真正的市場價值，進而難以判斷這樣的薪酬架構是否會帶來代理問題。此外，透過會計基礎評價模型、自我選擇模型、以及控制公司年紀效果與時間序列效果後的廻歸分析，對於完整薪酬揭露的市場價值亦得到相同的結論。

第二個延伸主題係欲探討的是，在控制住原本完整薪酬揭露所帶來的市場價值後，其他中等透明度的自願性薪酬揭露是否會帶來額外的市場價值提升效果。驗證結果指出，雖然中等透明度的薪酬揭露相較於強制要求揭露的資訊有較高的透明度，但是這樣仍然較不完整的揭露資訊內涵對於市場價值的提升幫助有限，然而，對那些通常會被認為是治理機制較差的非電子產業公司而言，中等透明程度的薪酬揭露，會因為被認為多揭露了一些相對的資訊斷層，而讓中等程度的薪酬揭露產生額外較高的市場價值。綜而觀之，本研究所提出的主張係認為，只有完整的揭露可以帶來較高的市場評價，而其他透明程度的薪酬資訊揭露對於公司市場價值的提升幫助有限。

The dissertation is set out to explore the market value of different transparency levels of disclosure of information on compensation paid to directors and executives. Under the theory of self selection, firms with higher levels of board independence will tend to provide comprehensive disclosure of compensation, thereby leading to lower agency conflicts. Since the authorities in Taiwan adopt a policy of gradual enforcement of compensation disclosure, firms are provided with discretion with regard to any greater levels of transparency that they may choose to provide. Such unique natural experimental setting is therefore exploited to examine the effects of different levels of transparency of compensation disclosure on market value.

The first essay is to answer the question of whether firms voluntarily providing comprehensive disclosure of information on compensation paid to directors and executives have higher market values. The evidence indicates that the market provides a higher valuation to those firms which elect to voluntarily disclose comprehensive information on their compensation practices. However, the electronics firms using large proportion of stock-based bonus are not valued higher due the reason that the difficulty for valuing the stock-based bonus makes the outsiders hard to identify the agency problems. The robustness from the Ohlson model, the self-selection model and the regressions controlling firm-age and time-series effects provides the same results.

The second essay is to extend the compensation disclosure issue from previous evidence by suggesting that whether medium level of transparency on compensation disclosure provide additional market value after controlling the effects of comprehensive disclosure. The evidence finds that even where such disclosure is in excess of the minimum mandatory requirements, lower levels of transparency in the overall disclosure of compensation practices are of very little help with regard to the creation of market value. However, for the non-electronics firms generally regarded as having relatively weak governance mechanisms, the effect of medium disclosure on market value is significantly positive because of the disclosure gap. The overall evidence suggests that only comprehensive disclosure on compensation provide higher market values, whilst other levels of transparency are of little for the market value creation.