标题: | 薪酬资讯揭露与公司价值 Compensation Disclosure and Firm Value |
作者: | 刘志良 Liu, Chih-Liang 许和钧 Sheu, Her-Jiun 经营管理研究所 |
关键字: | 薪酬资讯;完整揭露;代理问题;董事独立性;自我选择偏误;compensation information;comprehensive disclosure;agency conflict;board independence;self-selection bias |
公开日期: | 2009 |
摘要: | 本论文主要系探讨董事与经理人之薪酬资讯在不同揭露透明度下的市场价值。在自我选择的偏误下,有较高董事独立性的公司通常会倾向提供较完整的薪酬资讯揭露,进而降低代理问题,而台湾的主管机关提供了一个渐进执行的薪酬资讯揭露改革政策,所以针对是否要提供较高透明度之薪酬资讯的揭露要求,主管机关提供这些公司相当大的裁量选择空间,因此,本研究可以利用此一自然实验下的资料独特性,来验证不同薪酬揭露程度对公司价值的影响效果。 第一个研究议题系探讨公司自愿揭露完整的董事与经理人薪酬资讯是否会带来较高的市场价值。实证结果指出,市场针对那些自愿揭露完整薪酬资讯的公司反应出较高的市场价值,然而,对于那些使用大量权益为基础之工具作为红利发放的电子产业公司,其完整薪酬揭露的市场价值并不显着,因为这样以权益为基础的红利工具,外部投资人较无法衡量其真正的市场价值,进而难以判断这样的薪酬架构是否会带来代理问题。此外,透过会计基础评价模型、自我选择模型、以及控制公司年纪效果与时间序列效果后的廻归分析,对于完整薪酬揭露的市场价值亦得到相同的结论。 第二个延伸主题系欲探讨的是,在控制住原本完整薪酬揭露所带来的市场价值后,其他中等透明度的自愿性薪酬揭露是否会带来额外的市场价值提升效果。验证结果指出,虽然中等透明度的薪酬揭露相较于强制要求揭露的资讯有较高的透明度,但是这样仍然较不完整的揭露资讯内涵对于市场价值的提升帮助有限,然而,对那些通常会被认为是治理机制较差的非电子产业公司而言,中等透明程度的薪酬揭露,会因为被认为多揭露了一些相对的资讯断层,而让中等程度的薪酬揭露产生额外较高的市场价值。综而观之,本研究所提出的主张系认为,只有完整的揭露可以带来较高的市场评价,而其他透明程度的薪酬资讯揭露对于公司市场价值的提升帮助有限。 The dissertation is set out to explore the market value of different transparency levels of disclosure of information on compensation paid to directors and executives. Under the theory of self selection, firms with higher levels of board independence will tend to provide comprehensive disclosure of compensation, thereby leading to lower agency conflicts. Since the authorities in Taiwan adopt a policy of gradual enforcement of compensation disclosure, firms are provided with discretion with regard to any greater levels of transparency that they may choose to provide. Such unique natural experimental setting is therefore exploited to examine the effects of different levels of transparency of compensation disclosure on market value. The first essay is to answer the question of whether firms voluntarily providing comprehensive disclosure of information on compensation paid to directors and executives have higher market values. The evidence indicates that the market provides a higher valuation to those firms which elect to voluntarily disclose comprehensive information on their compensation practices. However, the electronics firms using large proportion of stock-based bonus are not valued higher due the reason that the difficulty for valuing the stock-based bonus makes the outsiders hard to identify the agency problems. The robustness from the Ohlson model, the self-selection model and the regressions controlling firm-age and time-series effects provides the same results. The second essay is to extend the compensation disclosure issue from previous evidence by suggesting that whether medium level of transparency on compensation disclosure provide additional market value after controlling the effects of comprehensive disclosure. The evidence finds that even where such disclosure is in excess of the minimum mandatory requirements, lower levels of transparency in the overall disclosure of compensation practices are of very little help with regard to the creation of market value. However, for the non-electronics firms generally regarded as having relatively weak governance mechanisms, the effect of medium disclosure on market value is significantly positive because of the disclosure gap. The overall evidence suggests that only comprehensive disclosure on compensation provide higher market values, whilst other levels of transparency are of little for the market value creation. |
URI: | http://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT079337811 http://hdl.handle.net/11536/40638 |
显示于类别: | Thesis |
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