將協商機制導入綠色供應鏈之影響與探討

Abstract

協商的概念近年已被廣泛使用於研究國際事務及國際貿易之進行，不同的協商機制回直接影響參與者之行為決策並進產衍生出不同的結果。本研究首先將從跨領域的觀點來介紹不同種類的協商理論，並了解促成協商機制順利運作的條件與要素為何。 本研究的核心目的在於建構一個能被實際運用於產業實例中的協商模型，在此所選定的產業案例為綠色供應鏈，而模型的主要概念則是來自於勞動經濟學中的勞資談判理論。我們期待藉由協商機制的導入來活絡供應鏈體系中，上中下游成員間的垂直合作。因此，我們建立了一個三階段的賽局模型，並且融合了綠色供應鏈理論及勞資談判理論，模型中的成員包含了政府、逆向物流供應者及最終商品製造商。藉由模型的推導，我們除可求得綠色供應鏈當中，在政府的最適經濟決策下，綠色原物料的最適價格與供應量，並可觀察到在不同的協商機制中，參與者會有不同的決策行為。 在模型推演結束後，我們發現逆物流供應商的議價能力以及成員所處的經濟結構會顯著影響協商的結果。若是逆物流供應商的議價能力越高，最終產品供製造商越難採行擴張性的生產政策，並且將進一步限制整體綠色供應鏈的總利潤；反之如果逆物流供應商的議價能力越低，最終產品製造商越容易擴大其產出，並且提高整體綠色供應鏈的總利潤。

The concept of negotiation has been widely studied and implemented in the fields with international affairs or global trade issues. Different negotiation mechanisms will directly result in different consequences depending on which strategy that participates conduct. This study firstly introduces various of negotiation theories based on the perspective of different science fields, understanding how to facilitate the negotiation process and make it sustainable. The core spirit of this study aims at constructing an applicable negotiation mechanism which could be implemented in real industry case. The concept of our model is inspired from the study of labor unit bargaining which propose in facilitating the cooperation in a supply chain. Therefore, we constructed a three-stage game which integrated the concept of green supply chain, including government, reversed-logistic suppliers and final-goods manufacturers. By solving the negotiation problem between revered-logistic suppliers and final-goods manufacturers, we can further infer the equilibrium results of price and quantity in terms of recycling raw material as well as government’s optimal environmental involvement approach. However, the most essential part of this study is to understand how the participants would perform their strategy in different negotiation scenario. In the result, we discovered that bargaining power and the type of game that negotiation follows would obviously impact the result of price and quantity. If the reversed-logistic supplier has higher bargaining power, it is more difficult for the manufacturer to conduct expanding strategy which further restricts the total profit of this green supply chain and vice versa when its bargaining power is sufficiently low.