白色騎士，敵意併購與股東利益

Abstract

在股東利益假說下，本研究探討當公司成為敵意併購者的併購對象時，若其採取引入白色騎士的方式以抵禦此併購的成功，以白色騎士之股東角度去觀察此舉對於達成目標之效率程度。本研究之樣本採用發生於1980年至2007年間敵意併購案件中成功併購目標公司的323家主併公司做為研究對象，並且進而將此樣本分為三個群組：成功完成併購之白色騎士、在白色騎士存在下，成功完成併購之敵意併購者，以及在白色騎士不存在下，成功完成併購之敵意併購者。經由呈現出此三個群組在併購宣告效果與交易內容結構之箇中差異後，本研究認為以白色騎士做為抵禦敵意併購的手段是支持管理者掠奪假說的行為。此外，由於交易內容結構為白色騎士或敵意併購者與目標公司共同協商的產物，本研究也對此進行深入剖析，發現雖然交易內容結構對於證明股東利益假說與管理者掠奪假說是很好的觀察重點，但是其對於解釋成功主併公司的宣告效果卻不明朗。最後，因為財務型併購者在併購市場中的獨特角色，本研究更將原先樣本之三個群組依照其投資屬性再加以分類。經由比較三個群組的交易內容結構之後發現，財務型併購者在取得目標公司股權比例以及併購溢酬上的差異並不是非常明顯。總而言之，本研究顯示引入白色騎士無法為目標公司及其本身之股東帶來好處。

Based on the stakeholder hypothesis, this paper examines the efficiency to shareholders of adopting white knights as a device to protect target firms against hostile takeovers. A total of 323 successful acquirers in the hostile takeover events over the period 1980 to 2007 are studied. The sample was divided into three groups: successful white knights, successful hostile bidders with white knights present and successful hostile bidders without white knights present. Comparisons of some aspects between the three groups indicate that adopting a white knight as an antitakeover provision supports a managerial entrenchment hypothesis. Moreover, since the deal structures are the products of negotiations between target firms and white knights, this aspect is also investigated and shows that although observing deal structures are excellent for illuminating two competing hypothesis, the managerial entrenchment hypothesis and the shareholders interest hypothesis, they are not responsible for the announcement effects experienced by acquirers. Finally, as a result of the special characteristics of financial buyers in the acquisition market, this study further divides the original three groups on the basis of the type of acquirer, and find that financial buyers are less concerned about share holdings and are indifferent in premiums, regardless of their characters in a hostile takeover event, a totally different outcome compared to corporate buyers. All in all, white knights do not benefit shareholders of target firms or themselves.