我國公司法第23條第1項之違反與股東代位訴訟實證研究

Abstract

民國55年新修之公司法第23條第1項所揭示之忠實義務與善良管理人之注意義務，為董事確立了最基本之義務。董事作為公司之負責人在負擔義務的同時，也受到被監督。相較於美國法制中有眾多的判例作為認定義務是否違反的判斷標準，公司法第23條第1項在董事被以民事程序究責的案件中以何種型態出現，法院如何認定此法條所包含之義務，以及法院之判斷標準，則尚有未明。此外，相較於美國法制中蓬勃的股東代位訴訟以及眾多的實證研究，我國董事被以民事訴訟程序究責可以歸類為哪些類型？股東代位訴訟在其中所佔的比例？這些類型有甚麼特色？則待透過實證研究來進行回答。

本篇論文透過以「公司法第23條第1項」等全文檢索語詞所取得之相關我國地方法院判決的實證研究確認了股東代位訴訟在公司董事之民事訴訟究責中所佔數量少，而得出少數股東對於公司之治理之強度與能力遠不及公司對自身之治理，抑或是公司董事、大股東之互相管理，惟由於從實證研究中可發現，經營派之董事鮮少被追究責任，而肯定股東代位訴訟之存在必要。儘管法院在公司法第23條第1項之違反認定上因傾向以明確法規之違反為判斷標準，此一法條之內涵將可望透過相關判決數量之增加，尤其是未違法卻被認定為違反義務之判決，而更加充實。

Section 23I of Company Act, amended in 1966, demonstrates the fundamental duty of corporate directors, the fiduciary duty. Directors bear the duties, at the meantime, being supervised. While principles and judgments has been established for judging fiduciary duties in the States, in Taiwan, it is still unclear how Article 23I of Company Act was raised in civil actions, how the court treats the duties, and the criteria thereof. In addition, how directors being charged with fiduciary duties in suits and how much the derivative suits stand are yet to be answered by empirical studies.

The empirical study, with Section 23I of Company Act as keyword, shows that shareholder derivative suits has little shares in the civil actions against directors for the violation of fiduciary duty. It implies that minority shareholders have inferior corporate governance capacity to corporate itself, or the inter-governance between corporate directors and major shareholders. However, with the finding that no directors backed with the support of management power was sued, shareholder derivative suits become essential to supervise directors. While courts now still depend on specific law or regulation as criteria of violation of fiduciary duty, it is believed that the bases of such criteria will be broaden with much more judgments, especially those that directors fail to meet fiduciary duty with no specific law or regulation violated.