不完全資訊下的債務協商

Abstract

本研究假設債權人無法得知真實價格，只能以觀察價格來做為債務協商的依據。 從假設推導出股東及債權價值的封閉解後，重新探討在可以債權協商的情形下，是 否有債務不效率的情形。本文指出，當股東比較有協商的權力時，債權人會要求股東支付資訊溢酬來補償資訊不對稱的損失。不過，當債權人比較有 協商的權力時，債權人不會主動的提出債務協商的請求。

When firms experience financial distress, equityholders may act strategically, forcing concessions from debthodlers and paying less than the originally-contracted interest payment. This article incorporates strategic debt service under imperfect information, which debthodlers catch the observation price instead of real price, and develops simple closed-form expression for debt and equity values. We analyze the efficient implication of renegotiation, showing that debthodlers will ask for information premium when equityhodlers can make take-it-or-leave-it offers and debtholders will never renegotiate actively when debthodlers can make take-it-or-leave-it offers.