完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位語言
dc.contributor.author賴宏琦en_US
dc.contributor.author郭家豪en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-26T01:07:57Z-
dc.date.available2015-11-26T01:07:57Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT079739501en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11536/45638-
dc.description.abstract本研究假設債權人無法得知真實價格,只能以觀察價格來做為債務協商的依據。 從假設推導出股東及債權價值的封閉解後,重新探討在可以債權協商的情形下,是 否有債務不效率的情形。本文指出,當股東比較有協商的權力時,債權人會要求股東支付資訊溢酬來補償資訊不對稱的損失。不過,當債權人比較有 協商的權力時,債權人不會主動的提出債務協商的請求。zh_TW
dc.description.abstractWhen firms experience financial distress, equityholders may act strategically, forcing concessions from debthodlers and paying less than the originally-contracted interest payment. This article incorporates strategic debt service under imperfect information, which debthodlers catch the observation price instead of real price, and develops simple closed-form expression for debt and equity values. We analyze the efficient implication of renegotiation, showing that debthodlers will ask for information premium when equityhodlers can make take-it-or-leave-it offers and debtholders will never renegotiate actively when debthodlers can make take-it-or-leave-it offers.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subject債務協商zh_TW
dc.subject不完全資訊zh_TW
dc.subject資訊不對稱zh_TW
dc.subjectrenegotiationen_US
dc.subjectimperfect formation,en_US
dc.subjectasymmetry informationen_US
dc.title不完全資訊下的債務協商zh_TW
dc.titleHow to Renegotiation with Imperfect Information?en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.department財務金融研究所zh_TW
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