可轉換公司債的延遲贖回-以公司治理角度再驗證

Abstract

過去文獻對於可轉換公司債延遲贖回的現象雖然已發展諸多理論，但至今依然無法有一個公認合理的解釋，本文以公司治理的角度去探討可轉換公司債的延遲贖回現象，過去鮮少有學者以公司治理面來解釋這個問題；本文並在加入公司治理的因素後，除了探討公司治理對於可轉換公司債延遲贖回的解釋能力外，亦重新檢驗過去學者所提出的若干假說。 本文所發展關於公司治理的假說，主要以代理問題的角度進行論述；文中主要分為兩個模型架構，依照因變數性質的不同，分別以Logistic模型與Poisson模型進行實證，試圖以不同模型更加完整的去從事此研究的實證分析。 實證結果發現，公司治理的確對於可轉換公司債的延遲贖回有顯著影響，且模型在加入了公司治理變數後，亦同時可驗證代理理論、財務危機成本假說及現金流量利益假說。

Many literatures have long discussed the delayed calls in convertible bond. However, there exists no exact explanation for the phenomenon. This study investigates the delayed calls in convertible bond by employing corporate governance mechanism, which was rarely concerned in previous studies. After considering the corporate governance factors, this study discusses the interaction between corporate governance and delayed calls in convertible bond, and also re-examines the hypotheses addressed in previous literatures. Since corporate governance relates to the issue of agency problems, in this study, the hypotheses are built accordingly. This study employs Logistic Model and Poisson Model to conduct the empirical analysis. The results indicate that the corporate governance factors have significant impact on the phenomenon of delayed calls in convertible bonds. Regarding of corporate governance mechanism, this study supports the agency theory, the hypothesis of financial distress cost, and the hypothesis of cash flow advantage.