完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | 趙文嘉 | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Chao, Wen-Chia | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | 陳穆臻 | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Chen, Mu-Chen | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-12-12T01:51:06Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-12-12T01:51:06Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT079836505 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11536/47976 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 在全球化的競爭市場,產品的生命週期逐漸縮短,消費者對於產品的期望提升,要求更多樣,使得許多企業開始重視供應鏈管理議題,期望能將供應鏈管理的理想,落實在企業之間。供應鏈管理旨在透過彼此間的合作與資訊分享,創造出更多的利益,達到雙贏的結果,使現實能夠更接近理想,合作與資訊分享有多種方式,供應合約(supply contract)即為其中一種,企業間透過不同類型的供應合約,可以達到風險共擔(risk sharing)的效果,使供應鏈當中的成員可以共同分擔供應鏈中面臨的風險及不確定性,以達到整體供應鏈營收提升的目標。 本研究應用Spence (1973)的訊號賽局模型,以分析營收分享合約(revenue sharing contract),參賽者包含一個供應商與一個零售商,供應商又分為高品質產品供應商與低品質產品供應商二類型。模型將探討零售商在不知道供應商真實類型的資訊不對稱情況下,要如何藉由供應商是否提出售後服務的訊號,猜測該供應商的真實類型,並決定要保留多少營收比例,並將其餘的營收分享給供應商。 研究結果顯示,當零售商的信念不受到供應商發出售後服務的訊號影響時,會得到一組混同均衡(pooling equilibrium);但當,零售商的信念會因為供應商發出售後服務的訊號而改變時,會得到一組分隔均衡(separating equilibrium),模型中將討論有哪些因素會影響到零售商的信念及零售商保留營收的比例。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | The product life cycle becomes shorter and shorter under the competitive market of globalization. Consumers’ expectation of products is increasing, and they have variety of demand. It makes many corporations to put the focus on the supply chain issue with other corporations. They hope the ideal of supply chain management can be carried out between corporations. Cooperation and information sharing can make the ideal be practical. Supply contract is a way to cooperate and share information. Through various kinds of supply contracts, the risk of supply chain can be shared by the members. And the profit of the whole supply chain can also be increased. This study applies the signaling game of Spence (1973) to analyze the revenue sharing contract. The players include one supplier and one retailer. Supplier is divided into two groups, which are high quality supplier and low quality supplier. The retailer does not know the real group of the supplier. The model is going to show how the retailer decides the sharing ratio under the asymmetric information of not knowing the real group of supplier. The result indicates that the pooling equilibrium is obtained when the retailer’s belief is not affect by the supplier’s signal of after-sale service. The separating equilibrium is obtained when the retailer’s belief is changed by the supplier’s signal of after-sale service. The model is going to show what are the factors affect retailer’s belief and revenue sharing ratio. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | zh_TW | en_US |
dc.subject | 供應鏈管理 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | 供應合約 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | 營收分享合約 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | 訊號賽局 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | Supply chain management | en_US |
dc.subject | Supply contract | en_US |
dc.subject | Revenue-sharing contract | en_US |
dc.subject | Signaling game | en_US |
dc.title | 資訊不對稱之營收分享合約分析 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Analyzing Revenue-Sharing Contract under Asymmetric Information | en_US |
dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | 運輸與物流管理學系 | zh_TW |
顯示於類別: | 畢業論文 |