主併公司經理人併購後之薪酬變化因素分析

Abstract

本研究針對1993~2006年間在美國進行的併購案件做分析，研究主併公司的經理人薪資報酬在併購後的變化程度，並且加入三大因素: 1. 公司績效表現 2. 併購案特質 以及 3.公司治理能力， 去探討其與經理人的報酬結構及報酬變動的關連性。本文並同時加入併購完成時的狀態去分別研究成功與失敗的併購案件，檢視其支付給經理人的報酬是否有顯著差異。 研究結果指出: 1. 經理人在成功併購的案子完成後，不管公司併購後該年績效表現如何，經理人的薪資報酬都有所增加。 2. 併購案件的條件特質也會影響經理人報酬，有雇請專業顧問公司協助併購或是併購金額相對公司價值比例較小的案件，主併公司會給予其經理人較高的酬勞。 3. 對於成功完成併購但公司績效不彰的主併公司而言，若其公司治理能力越佳則經理人所拿到的薪酬越少，此結果顯示公司治理扮演著有效監督的角色。

This study explores the determinants of executive compensation changes after acquisitions. I employ panel data regression models with control of industry-level and time-specific fixed effects to evaluate the change of CEOs compensation subsequent to acquisitions. Through the pay-performance sensitivity analysis, this study finds that CEOs can earn more if the acquisition is successfully completed regardless of firm performance. Further, bid characteristics also matter: Acquiring firms with the assistance of advisors or having smaller relative deal size are more likely to compensate their CEOs more incentives. Finally, corporate governance mechanism plays a vital role in aligning managers’ and shareholders’ interests. In particular, acquiring firms that completed successful deals but with poor performance afterward may compensate their CEOs less if they have strong corporate governance mechanism.