國家層級公司治理與現金持有部位之研究─以美、英、德、法為研究樣本

Abstract

依據自由現金流量假說認為企業自由現金流量越多將容易產生代理問題，然而文獻指出一個國家層級的公司治理程度愈好，其股東權利將獲得較高保障且融資限制也較低，將有助於提升該國企業的公司治理，也不至於有代理問題的爭議。由於英美法系與大陸法系國家對股東權利的保障程度不同，因此本研究利用多元回歸與panel 回歸分析來檢視美、英、德、法，四個國家之公司治理程度是否會影響企業現金部位。結果顯示英美法系的國家較大陸法系的國家持有較多的現金部位，其也說明國家層級的公司治理程度愈高將可以降低企業的代理問題對現金部位的敏感性。

Based on the free cash flow hypothesis, firms that have more free cash flow are prone to agency problem. However, previous empirical studies suggest that a country with better country-level governance has higher shareholder rights and lower financial constraints; therefore, it is able to improve its corporate governance and avoid agency problem. Because the level of protection to shareholders in the common-law and in the civil-law countries is different, we use ordinary least-squares regression and panel regression to analyze whether country-level governance affects corporate cash holdings in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and France. We find that the common-law countries have more cash holdings than the civil-law countries. Our study reveals that higher country-level governance can decrease sensitivity between agency problem and corporate cash holdings.