多資產情境下BOT特許公司股權結構之研究

Abstract

本論文針對BOT特許公司發起人股東兼具所有權及承攬權之利益衝突問題進行研究探討。除考慮發起人股東投資特許公司股權外，另可將資金挹注於市場投資組合與無風險資產進行風險分散操作，即本研究之發起人股東投資特許公司屬風險規避態度。本論文運用賽局理論為工具，分別建立承包商與營運商之雙方賽局，與加入銀行團後之三方賽局，並由Nash均衡觀念求解最適投資比例。本研究成果顯示影響發起人股東投資特許公司出資比例之要素有預期計畫營收、扣除承攬成本外之成本支出、特許公司營收變異數、對手與自身之努力程度與承攬量控制變數等。

This thesis makes a research on the founder equity of BOT concession companies which will procure for the ownership and employment right of the project and discuss the interests conflict problem. Besides considering the capital invested by founder equity of BOT concession companies, they also can invest in market portfolio and risk-free assets to disperse the investment risk, it means the founder equity of BOT concession companies have risk-aversion attitude. This research adopts Game theory and Nash Equilibrium Concept to establish and solve the optimization percentage of the two players game of contractor and operator first, and then add bank to three players game. We can find the factors which influence the investment percentage of founder equity of BOT concession companies are: expected project income, the cost which exclude the employment cost, variance of project income, effect of each others and employment variance.