標題: | 股利政策變革與機構法人持股比率關係之研究以台灣電子產業為例 Dividends Policy Revolution and Institution Investors’ Shareholdings: Evidence from Electronics Industry in Taiwan |
作者: | 羅素珠 Lo, Su-Chu 王淑芬 Wang, Sue-Fung 管理學院財務金融學程 |
關鍵字: | 機構法人持股比率;股利政策;公司治理;the ratio of institutional holding;dividend policy;corporate governance |
公開日期: | 2010 |
摘要: | 本論文以1987年至2010年為研究期間,資料均取自於台灣經濟新報資料庫,以台灣公開資訊觀測站所公開上市、櫃公司電子產業做為為研究對象,並以上、中、下游加以區分。2002年安隆事件發生後,公司治理相關的議題才被重視。而機構法人偏好投資公司治理佳的公司,因此機構法人之持股比例與公司治理有著密切的關係。然而,庫藏股制度於2000年8月正式開始實施,因此本研究主要在探討安隆事件前後股利政策與機構法人持股比率之關係,分析公司股利政策與機構法人持股之關聯性以及影響公司股利政策選擇之因素。
由過去文獻得知,機構法人整體而言,機構投資者和現金股利被認為具有保護投資者利益的功能,因此較偏好現金股利。機構法人與外部大股東監督公司治理的意願最強,若其持股比率較高將有助於降低代理問題,機構法人會選擇公司治理較佳的公司而決定持股比率之高低。
本研究分別以現金股利、股票股利及購回庫藏股作為股利政策的代理變數。而機構法人持股比率以國內、外法人持股比率做為代理。以公司業齡、負債比率、資產規模、資本支出、市價與帳面價值比以及資產報酬率做為控制變數,另外加入上、中、下游之虛擬變數進行迴歸分析。經由實證結果發現:
一、安隆事件前後機構法人持股比率彼此之間呈顯著不同。
二、機構法人持股比率與現金股利呈正向相關。
三、產業鏈別上、中、下游對股利政策呈現不同程度的影響。
關鍵詞:機構法人持股比率、股利政策、公司治理 This study examines the sample of electronics firms whose stock is listed on the stock exchange or traded over the counter at Taiwan Market Observation Post system(M.O.P.S), and distinguish among upstream, middle-stream, and downstream firms, all data are collected from Taiwan Economic Journal Data Bank between 1987 and 2010. Research on corporate governance issues was emphasized until the case of Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. occurred. The institutional investors prefer to invest well-governed firms, thus the ratio of institutional holding is closely related to corporate governance. However, the system of repurchasing stock (treasury stock) has been practiced since August 2000, the main purpose of this study is to review the relation between the dividend policy and the ratio of institutional holding before and after the case of Enron, and analyze the relevance between the firms’ dividend policy and the ratio of institutional holding, plus the factors influencing the choice of firms’ dividend policy. From previous studies we found that institutional investors (institutional buyers) as a whole prefer cash dividends, because it is regarded as possession of the function to protect the interests of investors Institutional investors and outside large shareholders they are most willing to supervise corporate governance, their higher shareholding ratio will help decrease proxy problem. Institutional investors will choose better-governed firms and decide the ratio of their holding. This study utilizes cash dividends, stock dividends, and buyback of shares respectively as proxy variables; the ratio of institutional holding utilizes the ratio of domestic and foreign institutional holding as proxy; years of business, liability ratio, scale of assets, capital expenditures, the ratio of market price and book value, and return on assets as control variables;plus upstream, middle-stream, and downstream firms as dummy variables additionally to make regression analysis. The empirical findings of this study indicate: 1.Pre-and post Enron corporate sector shareholding ratio was significantly different from each other. 2. The ratio of institutional holding is positively associated with cash dividends. 3. There are different degrees of influence on upstream, middle-stream, and downstream firms of the industrial chain for dividend policy. Keywords: the ratio of institutional holding, dividend policy, corporate governance |
URI: | http://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT079972522 http://hdl.handle.net/11536/50861 |
Appears in Collections: | Thesis |