標題: | 民間參與交通建設監督制度之研究 The Regulatory Framework of Private participation in transport infrastructure project |
作者: | 林英彥 Lin ing ynn 黃玉霖 Yu-Lin Huang 土木工程學系 |
關鍵字: | 交通建設;民間參與;監督;特許合約;交易成本;Transport Infrastructure;Private participation in infrastructure;Supervisory Framework;Concession Contract;Transaction Cost Economics |
公開日期: | 1998 |
摘要: | 交通建設為國家經濟命脈,完善便利之交通建設是提升或維繫國家競爭力之要因。但交通建設所需龐大經費,加上近年來政府財政困難,已無法完全負擔。鼓勵民間參與交通建設,不但可利用民間資金協助解決財政困難,還可提升經營效率,促使交通建設更能發揮功能。我國民間參與交通建設之相關法規制度漸趨健全,但在監督方面,則有所不足,故本研究乃建立初步交通建設之興建、營運及移轉監督制度,以作為民間參與交通建設之參考。本研究對國內有關民間參與交通建設之相關法規與國內外特許契約進行整合,進而擬定出初步監督制度應有之監督項目,其共有15項。以交易成本理論作為分析的出發點,由交易環境中的不確定性、資產特殊性、投機性等三者來決定各個監督項目應採行之監督方式,並配合監督方式應考量的資訊成本、彈性、契約風險、管制風險與投機行為等五項因素,以分析應有之監督制度。 Transport infrastructure is crucial to the prosperity of an economy, as a convenient and well-designed transportation system preserves and enhances the nation's overall competitiveness. Yet transport construction is extremely costly, and the Taiwan government can hardly afford the entire expenses, given the financial pressures that already exist. One solution is the participation of the private sector, which may, in addition, increase managerial efficiency and improve the utilization of transport infrastructure. Laws and regulations regarding private participation in transport construction have been rather sound in Taiwan today, but those concerning monitoring framework are not. It is therefore the purpose of this study to formulate an elementary framework on the supervision of private participation in transport infrastructure projects with respect to building, operating and transferring.The study first looks into Taiwan's laws concerning private participation in transport infrastructure projects and actual concession contracts in both Taiwan and abroad. Fifteen items, including operation safety and fee rule, are identified that should be placed under supervision. These items are then analyzed with transaction cost economics. Specifically, the uncertainty, asset specificity, and opportunism in the transaction environment help to determine how each item should be monitored; in turn, the information cost, degree of elasticity, contract risk, committee risk, and opportunistic behavior that entail will suggest how the supervision should be executed. |
URI: | http://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#NT870015071 http://hdl.handle.net/11536/63776 |
Appears in Collections: | Thesis |