標題: 我國網路詐欺防制之研究--以使用人頭帳戶為中心
Prevention of Internet Fraud--Focusing on the dummy account
作者: 古慧珍
Ku,Hui-Chen
吳巡龍
胡均立
劉尚志
Dr. Wu,Hsun-Lung
Dr.Hu,Jin-Li
Dr.Liu,shang-Jyh
管理學院科技法律學程
關鍵字: 網路詐欺;人頭帳戶;警示帳戶;非約定帳戶轉帳;洗錢防制法;事件研究法;法律之經濟分析;理性犯罪;Internet Fraud;dummy account;event study;economic analysis of law;rational crime model
公開日期: 2005
摘要: 隨著網際網路的普及,網路技術之成熟與上網人口、時數之激增,網路使用的活動內容也日趨多樣化,伴隨而來的負面效應,即是增加了新型態的犯罪機會,其中網路詐欺犯罪之層出不窮,直接對於電子商務的發展造成嚴重威脅,加之,網路犯罪之隱匿性、即時性,導致查緝之困難性,故對於網路詐欺犯罪之防制,已成為刻不容緩之議題。經本文實證統計發現,我國之網路詐欺案件多達66.23%伴隨使用人頭帳戶,換言之,即在網路之虛擬世界中,利用人頭帳戶從事詐騙行為之比例甚高,故本文認為從查緝人頭帳戶之角度來防制網路詐欺之發生,應能有效降低犯罪之發生數。 依照經濟學家Becker提出之「理性犯罪模型」,我國目前從人頭帳戶角度制定之防制詐欺犯罪策略,包括:「警示帳戶通報機制」、「非約定帳戶之轉帳限制」及「洗錢防制法第9條之修法」,分別為降低犯罪利得及提高刑罰之降低犯罪量手段。本文先從法律面探討前開防制策略之適法性,其中「警示帳戶通報機制」之運作並無法源依據,雖然先後於2005年5月8日修正公布「銀行法第45條之2第2、3項」、2006年4月27日發布「銀行對疑似不法或顯屬異常交易之存款帳戶管理辦法」,法律明文賦予金融機構對於可疑帳戶得暫停帳戶之交易功能,賦予「警示帳戶通報機制」運作之正當性,然而,在2006年4月27日之前無法源依據運作下之警示帳戶,仍有違法之虞。何況,「銀行對疑似不法或顯屬異常交易之存款帳戶管理辦法」之行政命令仍有多處超越母法授權範圍、目的之不當,應有再修正之必要。 再者,本文為檢驗政策及法律之制定,是否在實際運作上達到降低「網路詐欺」犯罪量效果,試從實證統計數據來檢視,然而,經過分析以後發現,從人頭帳戶角度制定之防制詐欺政策或手段,對於特定之詐欺類型即「網路詐欺」,並無明顯成果。繼之,本文則嘗試利用「法律之經濟分析」觀點來探討犯罪防制策略並無成效之原因。最後,本文依照「理性犯罪模式」及最低預防成本之觀點,建議應先要求金融機構審核、過濾可疑帳戶之申請及克盡配合員警查緝可疑帳戶之義務,另應提供法律誘因促使經營網路拍賣之業者更有意願採取預防網路詐欺發生之預防措施,此外,督促司法機關同步加重提供人頭帳戶以及使用人頭帳戶從事詐欺之量刑,以變動最小及最低之預防成本來達到嚇阻網路詐欺犯罪之效果。
Along with the popularity, technology enhancement, rapid growth of users and expansion of spending time in the Internet, the activities in this virtual world have multiplied. Its negative side-effect nourished new types of crime. Among them, Internet fraud has posed a serious threat to the development of e-commerce. Moreover, the anonymity and the instantaneous features of the Internet hinder the crackdown against this crime. According to this research, up to 66.2 percent of all Internet fraud cases, there was dummy account involvement. Therefore, hypothetically, detecting dummy accounts should effectively prevent Internet fraud. In the light of Becker’s “rational crime model”, prevention policies would function in two methods; one is to reduce the illegal gains, the other one is to increase the penalty. Several prevention policies announced on May 8, 2005 and April 27, 2006 justified the mechanism for banks to temporarily freeze dummy accounts. Nevertheless, modifications to a certain degree should be made to those laws and regulations regarding abuse of the power of autorotation and the manipulation for inappropriate purposes. Furthermore, this research tried to review the effectiveness of such prevention policies and regulations. Apparently, according to the statistics, there hasn’t been any obvious result in deterring Internet fraud by implementing policies to track down dummy accounts. From the viewpoint of economic analysis of law, this study probed the reasons why the prevention policies failed. In addition, following the “rational crime model” and the rule of minimum prevention cost, we suggest that, in order to deter Internet fraud in the most cost-effective way, the audit and screening procedures of personal accounts should be tightened up and the penalty of dummy accounts vending should be increased.
URI: http://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT009168513
http://hdl.handle.net/11536/64257
顯示於類別:畢業論文


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