民間參與公共建設特許契約談判行為之研究

Abstract

公共建設關係著國家經濟的發展以及人民生活品質的提升，然近年來政府經常性支出大量增加，使得大規模的公共建設計畫遭遇財政困難而難以推行。因此政府積極推動民間參與公共建設，並透過BOT（興建-營運-移轉）模式，運用特許競標機制，將公共建設之財產權（Property rights）轉移予民間特許公司，並以引進民間單位的資金與經營效率。 但民間參與公共建設的過程常面臨一些實務問題，尤其是在特許談判階段(Negotiation phase)，其經常面臨之問題包括︰(1)工程細部規劃、設計資料缺乏與不確定因素多；(2)參與談判各方對目標及風險分派之認知差異；(3)政府與民間特許競標團隊談判經驗不足；(4)議約談判期限短且倉促等。這一些問題會影響談判雙方的談判權力、策略應用與談判行為，進而對特許契約談判的過程與結果產生變化，並由於談判權力不對等與時間壓力的關係而造成政府單位明顯讓步且趨於劣勢的現象。 本研究之目的在探討BOT特許契約議約談判過程中，政府與特許競標團隊的互動行為，並對談判議約過程之現象提出解釋與分析。應用「賽局理論」模擬政府與特許競標團隊的特許契約談判協商過程，探討雙方因談判權力變化與時間壓力對談判過程與結果之影響；並利用移動理論探討雙方相互論價與讓步的過程，並引入雙方談判策略應用對整體談判之影響進行分析。本研究期能對特許契約契約談判過程進行分析與模擬，並發展民間參與公共建設特許契約談判決策模型，可供往後相關特許契約談判應用。

The economic development and the level on quality of life are related to infrastructure project. In recent years, government encountered the challenge of financial retrenchment when execute important infrastructure projects, because of the increasing of regularly expenditure. For resolve this problem, government enthusiastic published private participation in infrastructure investment. Transfer the public property right to private competitive company and induce financial and operating efficiency by concession competitive mechanism of Build-Operate-Transfer model. It exists a set of problems on concession-contract negotiation phase on executing infrastructure project. These problems include the lack of detail information about project, huge uncertainty influence, the gap of recognition about project’s objective and limitation about negotiating set. These will deep influence the process and outcomes of negotiation by variety of negotiating power, strategies and behavior between disputers. And it is resulting in phenomenon about literal concession and an inferior position on government. This research will try to capture the concession negotiation process and possible interactive responses of BOT contracting parties in game-theoretic models. Analyzing the influence on process and outcomes of concession-contract negotiation by capture the variability of bargaining power and time preference. The resulting models would enable a better understanding of the NOT concession negotiation process and provide some guidelines for contracting parties.