標題: DECISION MAKING ON STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY LICENSING: FIXED-FEE VERSUS ROYALTY LICENSING METHODS
作者: Chang, Ming-Chung
Hu, Jin-Li
Tzeng, Gwo-Hshiung
經營管理研究所
科技管理研究所
Institute of Business and Management
Institute of Management of Technology
關鍵字: Game theory;licensing;innovation;fixed-fee;royalty
公開日期: 1-Sep-2009
摘要: Because of a deterioration in the quality of the environment, this paper studies the effects of the environment and the economy on environmental technology licensing in a homogeneous Cournot duopoly model in order to reduce environmental pollution and hence improve social welfare. To this end, two licensing methods - namely, a fixed-fee licensing method and a royalty licensing method - are compared. It is found that a high emission tax rate induces the innovator to not license the environmental technology to the licensee under the fixed-fee licensing method. As for social welfare, a large innovation scale of environmental technology does not guarantee that social welfare will be maximized. Finally, a large innovation scale of environmental technology is likely to increase consumer surplus if the marginal environmental damage is significant. Consumers are likely to prefer royalty licensing to fixed-fee licensing. This conclusion differs from Wang's finding in 2002.
URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219622009003545
http://hdl.handle.net/11536/6698
ISSN: 0219-6220
DOI: 10.1142/S0219622009003545
期刊: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & DECISION MAKING
Volume: 8
Issue: 3
起始頁: 609
結束頁: 624
Appears in Collections:Articles