BOT附屬事業（批地）對本體事業投資行為之影響

Abstract

政府「批地（land grant）」是公共建設民營化為增加收益的策略之一，特許公司通常需要增加投資以獲得額外收益。影響投資決策的因素包括：財產權的歸屬、風險分派及專案融資的特性。。 本研究運用賽局理論分析特許公司在專案融資無追索權條件下的行為，並且發現在無追索權的情況下特許公司有過度投資的傾向，此行為受到額外收益的分配及特許公司的股權所影響。為降低特許公司的道德風險，銀行會減少放款金額以增加特許公司的股權資金，並且更嚴謹的加強監督。 以研究模型分析南北高速鐵路發展的策略。本研究結論由賽局理論的推討瞭解民間參與公共建設的批地政策對投資人的影響，更深入的認識批地政策以確保更有效率的被運用。

Land grant is a common policy tool which can used to capture external benefits for privatized infrastructure projects. To capture the benefits, concessionaires usually need to make additional investment. The decision to invest is influenced by such factors as net proceeds from related property development, risks involved, and the way how the projects are financed. In this study, Game theory is used to analyze concessionaires’ investment behavior under non-recourse project financing arrangements, The study finds that BOT investors tend to over-invest under non-recourse arrangements. The tendency is influenced by how the net proceeds from land-grants related investment is shore and the level of concessionaires‘ equity commitments. To avoid moral hazards of the concessionaires, financiers may reduce the amount of debts and thus increase the concessionaires’ capital commitments. The financiers may also ehannel additional resources to monitor the projects more closely. This study uses those finding to trace the early development of Taiwan’s north-south high-speed rail project. The concludes land grants as a policy tool for privatized infrastructure projects can be further understood by game-theoretical analyses. A better understanding insures how the tool could be used in a more effective manner.