公司治理與集團企業經營績效之關聯性研究

Abstract

由於產業及市場的快速變化，企業間產生各種形式的策略聯盟以整合運用不同企業優勢條件與能力，進而形成明顯之「集團企業」。 本研究之目的，係欲探討集團企業「公司治理」與「公司績效」之關聯性，以2007年至2011年為研究期間，選取中華徵信所2012年版「台灣地區大型集團企業研究」所收錄之集團企業，其國內上市(櫃)分子公司為研究對象，有效樣本共872家，以ROE、ROA、權益乘數、Tobin Q為衡量指標，使用OLS 迴歸分析，分由「股權結構」、「董事會」、「管理當局」等三個構面，探討公司治理結構特性對集團企業內之各分子公司經營績效之影響，並進一步檢視上述之關係式是否因考量產業型態因素而有所改變。實證結果發現： 在股權結構方面，大股東持股比率及董事持股比率愈高，代理問題可能愈惡化，因此呈現出公司績效愈差的情況；法人機構持股比例愈高對公司獲利能力及投資管理能力的績效愈好，市場價值也愈高。 在董事會結構特性方面，外部董事席次比例愈高，公司績效愈好，符合資源依賴理論（Resource Dependence Theory），當董事的背景越多元，對公司營運的討論越全面，也越能提供管理階層在政策上和管理上的建議，提昇公司營運績效；在董事會規模及董事持股質押比率部分，因各績效指標普遍未達顯著水準，故無法證明其有具體影響。 在管理當局結構特性方面，實證結果發現，無論在董事長兼任總經理，亦或是經理人內部化部分(包括董事會內部化、總經理內部化、財務長內部化)各項績效指標均普遍未達顯著水準，故不能證明其對企業績效有具體影響。 在產業特性方面，實證結果顯示出高科技產業的經營績效未必比傳統產業的績效佳。

Due to the rapid change in the industry and market, and produces various forms of strategic alliance between enterprises in order to integrate different corporate advantages and capabilities, and obvious "group of enterprises". This research of purpose, of for discussion group enterprise "company governance" and "company performance" of associated sexual, to 2007 to 2011 for research during, select China levy letter by 2012 version "Taiwan large group enterprise research" by included of group enterprise, its domestic listed (Cabinet) molecular company for research object, effective samples total 872 , to ROE, and ROA, and interests multiplier, and Tobin Q for measure pointer, using OLS return analysis, points by "equity structure", and "Board", and "Administration" in three dimensions, explore the characteristics of corporate governance structure on group influence within the enterprises of the company's operating performance, and further inspect the above factors is due to consider the relationships between patterns of change. empirical results found: (1) In terms of equity structure, shareholder and Director's shareholding ratio the ratio higher, agency problems may deteriorate more, therefore rendering the performance worse; legal entities stake higher profitability for the company and the performance of investment management, the better, higher market value. (2) In Board structure characteristics aspects, external directors seats proportion more high, company performance more good, meet resources rely on theory (Resource Dependence Theory), dang directors of background more diversified , on company operating of discussion more full, also more can provides management class in policy and management surface of recommends, upgrade company operating performance; in Board scale and the directors holding pledge ratio part, due to the performance pointer General is not up significantly level, so cannot proved its has specific effect. (3) In terms of management structure, empirical results found, both the Chairman concurrently General Manager, or Manager of internal parts (including the internalization of the Board, General Manager, Treasurer of internalization) pointers are generally did not reach a significant level of achievement, therefore it could not prove that have a specific impact on business performance. (4) In terms of industry characteristics, empirical results show that high-tech industry's performance does not necessarily better than traditional industries.