內線交易可罰性基礎及現行規範效果分析──以賽局論為中心

Abstract

我國證券交易法第157條之1為對內線交易之規範，該條文自民國77年增訂以來，學界及實務界多有各類肯定與否定的探討意見。在國內外已累積大量內線交易文獻的前提下，本文擬從經濟分析的角度探討內線交易的相關議題。首先，本文應用賽局理論，論證了為何禁止內線交易，能夠促進交易效率，為禁止內線交易一事，覓得不同的立論。其次，本文以成本效益分析方法，分析比較現行規範對社會的影響，發現就事後社會財富的立場而言，自由刑僅會帶來淨的社會成本。然而，本文以為，從事前嚇阻的角度來看，本文主張，刑罰仍有其存在必要性。 在實證研究部分，本文檢視93年依重刑化思維的修法與認罪減刑規範之施行效果，認為重刑化思維似無法達到嚇阻犯罪的功效，然認罪減刑規範卻有助於審判，且在共同被告的狀況下，尤具效果。除了判決質化分析外，本文亦以「明基電通案」、「綠點案」為對象，用個案研究法檢視法規適用上的問題，透過個案研究，發現內線交易案件會因審判者的價值判斷，而有個案認事用法上的差異，且在內線交易案件的審理上，我國仍存有程序法上的改善空間。

Since Securities and Exchange Act article 157-1, so-called “insider trading rule (ITR)”, was enforced in 1988, this rule was always arguable, whatever positive or negative arguments, in academic and judicial profession. Under the premise that there are many foreign or domestic studies, this article would discuss some ITR issues through economic analysis. First, it would be demonstrated how insider trading decreases market efficiency by applying game theoretical approach, so it should be prohibited. Second, the effect of current ITR would be analyzed by cost-benefit analysis approach, and it appeared that imprisonment would ex post bring with social cost. However, criminal punishment is necessary to deter crime ex ante. In the part of empirical study, the effect of amendment under severe criminality policy and the amendment of plea bargaining in 2004 would be surveyed. We discovered that it could not be reached the goal of deterrence under severe criminality policy, but it was helpful for prosecution and trial by the application of the plea bargaining rule, especially in the situation of joint offenders. Besides the qualitative analysis, the problems existed in the application of ITR would be discussed by case study research through “BenQ case” and “Green Point case”. By case study, it was discovered that the difference of the result in IT case mostly came from the difference of judges’ objective value. After discussion, there are some comments of the improvement of the procedure law in IT case.