經理人之間的競爭是否會影響負債代理成本之研究

Abstract

本篇論文主要探討經理人之間的競爭是否會增加公司的負債代理成本。對於公司股東而言，期望公司進行具有較高風險但是報酬率較高的投資；對於債權人而言，卻希望公司盡量減少投資的風險。所以當股東鼓勵CEO進行高風險的投資時，債權人會相對應的提高風險溢酬補償隱藏的投資風險。過去的文獻都著重於經理人薪資的組成對於代理問題的影響，本篇著重於經理人之間為了被提拔為更高階的經理人而競爭，更高的階級可以獲得更高的薪水和榮耀，研究指出經理人之間的競爭確實會增加公司的價值，但是同時以會增加債權人對公司要求的利率，股東藉由經理人的競爭獲得利益，而債權人同時也為了避免風險轉移先提高了風險溢酬。

In this paper, we investigate the compensation gap between senior managers and cost of debt. The compensation gap is set to align managers and shareholders, which increases firm risk. We find the tournament between managers do really increase firm value, but borrowing cost arises as the compensation gaps widen. This means the compensation gap can urge managers to take their best effect to increase firm value and accept riskier investments to increase the opportunity of being promoted to CEO, bond holders correct their risk premium to make up the potential losses of the risk-shifting problem.