論匯率措施於WTO規範之合法性— 以中國匯率措施為中心

Abstract

本文探討低估匯率措施與WTO補貼規範之合法性審查，研究低估匯率是否構成WTO補貼規範下之禁止性出口補貼，或違反WTO關稅貿易總協定有關匯兌安排之規定。 為使此研究主題更加具體，本文將以中國與美國間的人民幣匯率爭議為例，探討中國匯率措施是否違反WTO補貼相關規範。本文首先從中美間人民幣匯率爭議之基礎出發，討論世界匯率制度與匯市運作、國際貨幣基金對會員國現行的匯率制度之認定與分類，以及人民幣匯率制度之沿革，再以人民幣匯率被低估之研究基礎，討論人民幣低估匯率與WTO補貼法規之合法性審查。 就人民幣匯率與WTO補貼法規下之合法性審查，本文將限縮研究於WTO的禁止性出口補貼規定，研究範圍包括GATT第十六條的補貼，以及SCM第三條的禁止性出口補貼。此外，本文也進一步研究人民幣匯率措施所涉之GATT第十五條匯兌安排，分析GATT第十五條第二項規定下，WTO與IMF就貨幣準備、國際收支平衡與外匯安排等特定事項之權責與分工，並討論人民幣匯率政策以GATT第十五條第九（a）項正當化SCM違反之可能性，最後分析人民幣匯率政策是否可能背離GATT條文意旨，而違反GATT第十五條第四項。 本文研究結論認為，低估匯率措施不符合SCM出口補貼的要件，並不構成禁止性出口補貼，但低估匯率措施所造成的出口補貼效果，可能使補貼意旨無法達成，進而違反GATT第十五條第四項，因此人民幣匯率爭議若提付WTO爭端解決機制，仍有違反WTO規定之可能。

The thesis centers on the consistency of undervalued exchange rate policy with WTO agreements. This research deals with the issue of whether an undervalued exchange rate policy constitutes a prohibited export subsidy under SCM or violates article XV of GATT. This thesis will take China’s exchange rate policy as an example. Chinese currency, Renminbi, has appreciated more than 30% against the dollar since 2005. However, it is estimated that the Renminbi should have been appreciated more significantly considering the significant growth rate of GDP, huge amount of hot money and massive amount of foreign reserve income. The IMF affirmed this presumption by labeling Renminbi as “moderately undervalued” currency. The United States, one of China’s biggest trading partners, thus publicly alleges that China’s undervalued exchange rate stimulates export and constitutes a prohibited export subsidy under WTO agreements. The research is based on the presumption that Renminbi is undervalued and examines if this undervalued exchange rate policy meets the requirement of a prohibited export subsidy under SCM. This thesis also analyzes the possibility of utilizing GATT Article 15 paragraph 9(a) as a justification if there’s any violation of SCM. The research further discussed the cooperation between WTO and IMF regarding exchange arrangement under GATT Article 15 paragraph 2. Lastly, this paper discusses if an undervalued exchange rate policy frustrates the intent of GATT under GATT Article 15 paragraph 4. This thesis concludes that China’s exchange rate policy does not constitute a prohibited export subsidy, while it is possible to frustrate the intent of GATT and thus violates Article XV paragraph 4 of GATT.