經理人報酬和收購之研究

Abstract

本篇論文主要研究誘因式的報酬和友善收購以及惡意收購之間的關係。由於惡意收購被視為一項高風險的工作，所以在執行前所給予經理人的誘因式薪酬是否足以驅使他們去涉入風險完成收購工作是本篇論文主要討論的目的。在另一方面，我們也會去研究，在事前所給予經理人的誘因式薪酬是否可以促使他們只利用現金購買的方式去收購目標公司而不是利用股票購買或是混合的方法，由於現金購買的方式是源自於高階經理人對於自己的過度自信，而造成他不用股票而用現金去收購，同時這個方式也會使的投資案件風險提高。而本篇論文的結果顯示出，事前所給予經理人的誘因式報酬，確實可以誘使經理人去選擇挑戰風險較高的惡意收購案件，而同時也會激勵高階經理人傾向利用純粹現金購買的方式去收購目標公司，這兩個結果都顯示出，誘因式的薪酬確實可以誘使一位經理人去勇敢地涉入收購的風險，並挑戰自己。

This paper investigates the relationship between the incentive compensation and takeover activities including friendly takeover events and hostile takeover events. Due to the fact that hostile takeover is perceived as a high risk task, therefore to test whether the higher incentive compensations granted to CEOs in advance are strong enough to compensate them for choosing to challenge the hostile takeover tasks which are associated with higher risk, rather than choosing the safer friendly takeover jobs is our main purpose. On the other hand, we will also examine that whether the incentive compensation granted to the CEOs in advance will make them to use the cash-only method of payment which is associated with high risk to merge the target firms instead of choosing the stock-only or even the mix tactics. Our result shows that the incentive compensation granted to the acquiring firm’s CEOs beforehand actually urge them to choose a riskier future career path namely to implement the high risk hostile takeover jobs. In addition, we also find out that the incentive compensation granted to the CEOs in advance will urge them to use the cash-only method of payment to acquire the target firms.