CEO權益型薪酬結構變動的決定因素與對風險承擔的影響

Abstract

CEO權益型薪酬結構改變的決定因素為何？本文發現，在2006年至2012年美國上市公司之非金融機構中，上一年的股票報酬變動、Size變動與股票薪酬比率、股票與選擇權薪酬比率的增量，呈現正向關係；而CEO Duality (CEO with Chairman)變動，與股票薪酬比率、以及股票與選擇權薪酬比率的增量，呈現負向關係。可見公司績效表現變佳、規模成長、CEO有監督機制，則薪酬結構會增加股票的比重。再者，我們也探討了CEO權益型薪酬結構與風險承擔的關係，實證結果發現股票薪酬會顯著減少公司股票報酬風險，而選擇權薪酬會顯著提升公司股票報酬風險。再者，公司的反併購指數的變動與權益型薪酬的增量，呈現正向關聯。雖然文獻對於股票薪酬或是選擇權薪酬的激勵效果尚未有清楚結論，但是若以股票報酬相對風險論之，股票薪酬是比選擇權薪酬來得佳。

This paper tries to find out the determinants of the change of equity-based compensation structure. We find that when the change of stock return and size increase positively, the percentage of stock compensation and the stock-minus-option compensation relative to last year increase. Moreover, when the change of CEO duality increase positively, the percentage of stock-compensation and the percentage of stock-minus-option compensation relative to last year decrease. The empirical results represents that when firms perform better, sizes are bigger, and when there is a supervision mechanism of CEOs, stock compensation relative to last year will rise. Furthermore, the change of entrenchment index is positively correlated with equity-based compensation relative to last year. We also investigate the relation between equity-based compensation and risk-raking. Option compensation will increase firms’ stock return risk, but stock compensation will decrease firms’ stock return risk. Although there is no obvious conclusion that whether stocks or options are better, this article shows that stock compensation dominates option compensation in the view of risk-taking.