性別與代理人問題對經營績效的影響

Abstract

近50年來，隨著來女性投入勞動市場的增加(Fullerton, 1999)，一般職位及高階管理職位都開始陸續出現了女性的蹤跡。研究顯示女性CEO在公司治理表現較男性CEO來的出眾，但是，男女待遇在升遷及報酬上卻仍然存在着巨大的差異。本研究突破以往使用單一回歸模型的方法，運用結構方程式模型(SEM)檢試1992年至2013年間S&P1000企業中，代理成本代表的治理因素及相關潛在變數在性別上的差異。本研究發現相較於男性CEO，女性CEO在花費同樣的擔保成本 (Bonding Expenditure)、監督成本 (Monitoring Expenditure)、殘餘成本(Residual Loss)時，公司制理的表現較好。研究建議基於公司治理績效而言，女性CEO薪資是被低估的。

Research of gender difference on firm performance has been reviewed, and evidence is found to prove women CEO lead the firm to better performance. However, gender gap in promotion opportunities and compensation remains unsolved. This research breakthrough regression method and use SEM to provide a view from unobservable cost, agency cost, to discuss gender difference by using S&P1000 data from 1992-2013 in Execucomp. It is found that comparing with male CEOs, female CEOs have higher firm performance with the same amount of spending on three different types of agency costs: bonding expenditure, monitoring expenditure, and residual loss. The implication of this study is that women compensation has been underestimated for the effort they pay.