「所有權」認識邏輯的畛域化－1920～1925朱謙之思想重探

Abstract

在本論文的研究中，我透過朱謙之以1920－1925年的思想脈絡，重新藉其對「所有權」的問題感介入了那時候的文化場域。回溯這時期，朱謙之在「所有權」命題下展開的問題脈絡，我們將看到他如何追問歐戰後由啟蒙知識夾帶出的認識性限制。但另一方面，我們又可以察覺此時朱謙之更意圖透過佛學、老子、儒學等思想資源為解開主體封閉性認識，作出積極的提問。

經由朱謙之藉「所有權」的問題意識展開，本研究察覺那時中國的改革語境無論是對西方民主理念的討論、蘇俄國家模式的推演，或就是於東西文化爭議後透過「少中」（少年中國學會）部份成員帶出的「新國家主義」，其實都演繹著把主體和世界實證化成圖示性的結構前提。但也就是這實證化的視角，它更突顯出「所有權」的話語邏輯在認識性問題上的逼促能量。回顧一戰後中國所面對的世界格局，我們不難察覺如何將主體和世界配置回發展主義下的視野，正構成了朱謙之不斷遭遇的歷史場景。尤其，此一支配性的認識結構，非旦藉著翻譯、調校、共振等知識生產的模式將治理性合理化成主體自我建構的藍圖；此外，它還透過區域性的競合關係，使配置內外畛域、區辨差異的共識邏輯得到進一步的加強。在朱謙之所涉入的論述場域，我們不僅可以觀察到如此敘事模式的展開，並更可以發現他正是以這時代性話語作為其檢討的起點，從而分享著歷史推進下的困境。

將朱謙之就「所有權」的思考，視為一時代話語結構的支點；本研究將指出，朱謙之如何在回溯啟蒙知識「實證化」的認識性限制之同時，又藉著佛學、老子對「無」的探究及儒學「情」辯證性的啟發，來帶出思想可以持續發生且破除內外、差異甄別的可能性。就經由朱謙之延展於佛學和老子對「無」的思考來看，怎樣解開時代話語內部主／客、能指／所指相互對位及算計下的表象問題，組織成他這一道思考命題的核心焦點。透過「無」的思考，朱謙之意圖闡明的也就是要讓表象主體與表象客體的能指、所指可以鬆動，並藉此帶出思想重新介入和呈現的能力。而朱謙之對「情」辯證性的探索，則是進一步表達出了能表、所表之間鬆動和重新表象的運動過程。論證上，朱謙之透過「物」之「離麗」的發問起點，以及銜接著他對《周易》「卦、彖、爻、辭、象」的探索介面，以說明貼近於「物」反覆往來離開的辯證性能量，才是構成主體獨特性和多重紋理的探索起點，而這正也就是認識及思想解放的問題。

本論文，就是我伴隨其朱謙之在1920－1925年之間的思考，對「所有權」命題所作出的思索。面對著當時全球佈局，以及隱匿於區域之間的競爭模式，朱謙之對「所有權」問題化的關鍵意涵還是在於：如何可以不把主體算計性地配置回同質化的共識模式中？要怎樣才能解開主體自居的僵固模式，並從中展開不同交匯、對話和理解的可能？而我們又該如何對既有的認識模式進行改造，並創造出認識解放的可能性空間？

Anchored in his thought from 1920 to 1925, my dissertation probes into Zhu Qianzhi's problematic conception of property, and accordingly attempts to re-intervene and re-articulate the cultural discourses in Zhu's contemporary. Revisiting this duration of his developing contexts questioning on the concept of property, we will see, on the one hand, how Zhu, after WWI, tries to examine the epistemic limit of the knowledge brought about by the Enlightenment. On the other hand, we are also going to witness how Zhu takes Buddhism, Lao Zi and Confucianism as intellectual resources to undo the epistemic fixation of the ideological subjective closure.

According to Zhu's analysis of property, we are able to find out that the Chinese revolutionary discourses, induced by either the western democratic ideas or the Soviet State paradigm, or even those of New Nationalism praised by some members of Young China Association, have already hold an positivist assumption for purpose of structuring different subjects and the worlds we live into the sameness. It is hardly to neglect that this positivist vision is indeed the compulsive energy enhancing the limited logic of ownership. Therefore, when revisiting the world situation that China confronted with after WWI, we will find that the positivist schema of property at developmentalist request is the historical scene continually contemplated by Zhu. Precisely, in accordance with the cultural translation, the political set-up and the resonance in mode of production of knowledge, this dominated epistemic structure does not only legitimize the governmentality as the blueprint for subjects’ self construction, but also, via the relations of regional competition, it continues reinforcing the logic of consensus that distributes the inside-outside and distinguishes the different from the same. Nevertheless, starting from the discourses and the intellectual disputes of property that Zhu has engaged in, we would be able to acquire the nuanced intellectual situation at that age, and to re-assess how Zhu examines these difficult problems.

Surrounding his conception of property, this research will also focus on how Zhu explores the possibilities of dynamic force of thought from the intellectual resources of Buddhism, Lao Zi and Confucianism when arguing against the epistemic limit of positivist assumption. One of the main threads of Zhu's thought extended via the Buddhism and Lao Zi is based on the proposition of “nothingness.” In his understanding, Zhu suggests that "nothingness" means to unfasten the binding between signifier and signified. Thus, what Zhu would like to elaborate could be that "nothingness" would bring about the moment to loosen the represented mode of subject and object; furthermore, the “nothingness” might be itself the act of letting the abilities of thought and intervention be able to come into the appearance. Along with the conception of "nothingness", Zhu probes into Confucianism notion of “情” (qíng). Zhu's investigation of “情” (qíng) might depict the rather profound movement of dialectical forces of thought. In his argument, Zhu inaugurates his thinking from「物」(the thing) 之「離麗」（abilities of departure）and brings together the discussion of 「卦、彖、爻、辭、象」 in 《周易》. Through his elaboration, this research would like to argue that Zhu might suggest a particular kind of dialectical movement of thought, of which it brings about the constant force of departure. That is to say, the thing obtains its abilities of departure throughout the dialectical movement; furthermore, it is the starting point of the singular process of subjectivation as well as the emancipatory moment of knowledge.

In this research, I will discuss the logic of property and its epistemic limit along with Zhu Qianzhi’s thought from 1920 to 1925. When confronting the global distribution and the competitive mode of regions, through his problematization of concept of property, Zhu might suggest: how could it be possible that the different subjects were not being counted into the sameness dominated by the logic of consensus? By which way the subject can unfold the identified mode and meanwhile connect with each other in multiple ways? Also, how could we transform the given epistemic structure and to bring out the spaces of possibilities, or say, the ways to emancipation?