性別與作業結構對蜈蚣賽局決策表現的影響

Abstract

本研究旨在探討資訊透明的決策情境下，作業結構與性別對決策行為的影響。研究中採用蜈蚣賽局作業，以性別組成(對方為同性的男、女及對方為異性的男、女)為組間變項，故事(是否涉及公共利益)、賽局長度（長、短）、雙方利益差距（大、小）、利益增值(高、中、低)為組內變項，122名受試者被隨機組成不同性別的兩人小組，在不知對手為誰的情形下進行決策。以賽局結束時間點、背叛次數為依變項的變異數分析結果，發現決策作業結構的主效果顯著，利益涉及第三方、賽局長度較長、雙方利益差距較小、利益增額較高都會使得賽局結束時間延後、背叛對方的傾向下降。然性別組成的主效果不顯著，只有在第一局時，女性在面對利益涉及第三者時，與對方合作的傾向會顯著高於利益只涉及決策雙方的情境；男性則呈完全相反的趨勢，在利益只涉及雙方時，與對方合作的傾向會高於涉及公共利益的情境。此外，資料也顯示對手為同性的女性合作傾向最低、結束時間最早，而對手為異性的男性與對方合作傾向最高、賽局結束時間最晚，但性別對決策行為造成的差異未達顯著。

The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of task structure and gender on Centipede decision-making. One hundred and twenty-two college students were randomly paired into male-male, male-female, or female-female groups to participate in 50 Centipede games. The games were composed by 2 cover stories (third party involved, no third party involved) X 2 game lengths (long, short) X 2 levels of difference between bilateral benefit (big, small) X 3 levels of increment in benefit with time (high, medium, low). Results of experiment showed that when the game involved public benefit, the longer relationship, smaller initial difference in benefit, or the larger benefit increment, a participant’s tendency to defect would be lower. The main effect of gender composition was not significant. Females tended to be more cooperative when the third party’s benefits were involved, but only in the first game. The cooperation in centipede games was generally lower when females are playing with another female. The opposite pattern was found for males who played with females.