股權結構與經營績效之影響

Abstract

自從Berle and Means(1932)指出公司經營權與所有權之間可能因為資訊不對稱，造成利益衝突而產生代理問題以來，股權結構與公司經營績效間的關係就成為往後學者們在公司治理研究上主要的焦點。以企業的觀點而言，公司治理即指公司運作的方式及管理者和董事全體應負的責任，故公司治理的問題與股權分散程度有密切的關係。今日企業所有權與經營權分離的現象越來越顯著，再加上台灣資本市場普遍缺乏存在於西方市場中用以減輕代理成本的控制機制，因此使得董事會扮演舉足輕重的角色。同時，董事會之結構與運作的方式會直接影響到公司的績效，而這兩者間密不可分的關係，是本研究主要探討之問題。 本研究以1999~2003年不包括金融保險產業之台灣上市公司為研究範圍，模型變數皆取自台灣經濟新報。參考Chen, Hexter and Hu (1993)及Short and Keasey(1999)提出之迴歸模型，探討公司董監事的股權結構對公司經營績效的影響。並以Proxy Q與ROE分別代表公司之價值與獲利能力。實證發現，Proxy Q與ROE的結果不一致，但大致上來說，台灣公司的股權結構與經營績效確實具有非線性的關係，並同時存在「利益收斂假說」與「鞏固地位假說」。 雖然在某些情況下，增加董監事的持股比例可以提昇公司的經營績效，但是，其實影響公司經營績效的因素太多，因此企業若只想從增加董監事持股比例以達到監督公司，進而提昇公司經營績效，其成果實屬有限，應再加強其他的監督機制，以及健全企業本身的財務結構，會較為理想。

After Berle and Means(1932) indicated the agency problems caused by the asymmetric information and benefits conflict between owner and manager, the ownership structure and corporate performances become the focused of scholars’ corporate governance research. At the viewpoint, corporate governance means the way of firm work, and the responsibility of managers and directors, so the issue of corporate governance has relation with disperse ownership. The dispersion of owner and manager is more clear now, and the capital market lack the mechanism of reduce agency cost, so the board of directors play a major role. The board’s structure and operation could affect firm’s performance, so the relationship of ownership structure and performance is our major research. The listed corporations excluded financial and insurance are the study objects of this research. The reference material was collected from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) from 1999 to 2003. Use the model made of Chen, Hexter, and Hu (1993) and Short & Keasey (1999) to analyse the relationship of ownership structure and performance. Proxy Q and ROE means firm value and profit ability separately. We finding that the ownership structure and operation performance in Taiwan have non-linear relationship, exist “Convergence of interest Hypothesis” and “Entrenchment Hypothesis” simultaneously. Increasing directors’ holding could raise firm performance in some situation, but there are many factors of effect performance. So, the result has limit if firm just increase directors’ holding to raise performance. Firm should enhance other monitoring mechanism and financial structure.