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dc.contributor.author蘇志勳en_US
dc.contributor.authorChih-hsun Suen_US
dc.contributor.author唐瓔璋en_US
dc.contributor.authorEdwin Tangen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-12T02:48:38Z-
dc.date.available2014-12-12T02:48:38Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT009237535en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11536/77289-
dc.description.abstract企業之間的交易活動,往往因為資訊不對稱(Information Asymmetry)與鎖入效應(Lock-in Effect)促使交易的一方進行投機行為,即所謂的機會主義(Opportunism)。為了抑制機會主義,Williamson首先提出透過垂直整合,能將交易成本降至最低,促進交易的效率。後續學者則提出其他可行的治理機制並進行實證研究,包括監督、供應商的專屬性投資和關係規範。本研究即是針對大中國區的連接器廠商,以問卷調查的方式,透過OLS迴歸模型,將這些機制作一整體性的實證檢驗。有鑑於諸多文獻均指出「關係」是在中國經商的關鍵,因此本研究假設關係規範在三種治理機制中將最具成效,並可以加強其他兩種機制對機會主義的抑制能力。 根據研究結果,發現只有監督這項機制才稍微具備抑制機會主義的能力;相反地,關係規範反而是最容易促使機會主義發生的機制。可見在技術變化快速的產業,以及講究關係的文化中,良好的關係反而提供了更多投機取巧的機會。本研究的結果與過去西方的研究結果大相逕庭,同時也針對供應商的管理議題,為中、港、台三地的廠商提出不同的觀點。zh_TW
dc.description.abstractFirms that involve in exchanges often face some problems which may be harmful to one or both of the firms, such as information asymmetry and lock-in effect. Opportunism is the outcome of these phenomena and will lower the efficiency of the entire exchange system to a great extent. According to O. Williamson, vertical integration serves as a good measure to lower the transaction costs between organizations and therefore improves the transaction efficiencies. Williamson’s argument is followed by many researchers, and they proposed some governance mechanisms such as monitoring, hostages from the suppliers, and relational norms which are proven effective in curbing opportunism. This research simultaneously examines the effects of all these three mechanisms in the Greater China area. Due to the highlighted emphasis put on “relations” in this region by much literature, relational norms is hypothesized as the most effective among these three mechanisms, and to reinforce the curbing effects of other two. According to the results, only monitoring has slight effect of curbing opportunism. Contrary to the hypotheses, supplier hostages and relational norms promote the occurrence of opportunism to a great extent. Thus, in an industry with rapid changes in technology, and a culture where relations are emphasized, good relationships will foster opportunisms. The results of this research are opposite to the former western researches, and provide a different perspective for the firms in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in terms of supplier management.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subject機會主義zh_TW
dc.subject監督zh_TW
dc.subject抵押品zh_TW
dc.subject關係規範zh_TW
dc.subject大中華區zh_TW
dc.subjectOpportunismen_US
dc.subjectMonitoringen_US
dc.subjectHostagesen_US
dc.subjectRelational Normsen_US
dc.subjectThe Greater China Areaen_US
dc.title不同治理機制對機會主義之效果:以大中華區為實證zh_TW
dc.titleThe Effects of Different Governance Mechanisms on Opportunism: An Empirical Examination in the Greater China Areaen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.department經營管理研究所zh_TW
Appears in Collections:Thesis