以核心代理問題觀點探討台灣上市電子公司公司治理與權益資金成本關聯性

Abstract

本研究以存在於大股東與其他小股東的核心代理問題出發，以股權結構、董事會組成、管理型態、超額關係人交易、大股東介入股市五個構面，共十四個公司治理相關變數，衡量台灣上市電子公司的核心代理問題與權益資金成本的關聯性。 實證結果顯示，股權結構方面，「控制股東現金流量權」愈大，正誘因效果愈強，權益資金成本愈低；「控制股東控制權與現金流量權偏離度」愈大，負侵佔效果愈強，權益資金成本愈高。董事會組成結構方面，「控制股東成員擔任董事、監察人比率」愈低及「獨立董監占董事會比率」愈大，代表董事會較不受控制股東控制，董事會獨立性較佳，控制股東負侵佔效果較弱，權益資金成本愈低。管理型態方面，「機構投資人持股比率」愈高，外部監理力量較強，控制股東負侵佔效果愈小，權益資金成本愈低。超額關係人交易構面並未有變數與權益資金成本有顯著相關性。大股東介入股市構面「董監事持股質押比率」與「超額轉投資比率」愈高，控制股東介入股市行為愈明顯，權益資金成本將顯著提升。 最後將十四個公司治理相關變數整合成公司治理綜合指標，實證結果得到該指標與公司權益資金成本呈顯著負相關，代表該指標愈高時，公司之公司治理機制較完善，小股東的利益較不會被大股東所傷害，核心代理問題愈低，因而降低公司權益資金成本。

Based on the central agency problem between controlling shareholder and minor shareholders, this research uses the five dimensions, which namely ownership structure, board composition, manage pattern, abnormal relatet party transaction, and stock overinvestment of controlling shareholder amounting to fourteen variables, to investage the relationships between central agency problem and the equity capital cost for Taiwain listing electronic companies. Empirical results are summarized below:1.In terms of ownership structure, the larger the cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder is, the larger the positive incentive effect is, and leads to higher equity capital cost.2.When the deviation between the voting rights and the cash flow rights is larger, it implys larger negative invasion effect and results in higher equity capital cost.3.In terms of the board composition, when controlling shareholder members occupy fewer directors or supervisor sits and the company has more independent directors or supervisors, the board is less dominated by controlling shareholder and leads to the lower equity capital cost. 4.In terms of management pattern, when the shares held by institutional investors are higher, the external monitors are better for the companies and lead to lower equity capital cost.5.In terms of abnormal related party transaction, there is no obvious relationships between the variable and the equity capital cost.6.In terms of stock overinvestment of the controlling shareholder, when the pledged share ratio and the overinvestiment ratio is higher, stock overinvestment behavior of the controlling shareholder is more apparent and results in higher equity cpital cost. We combine the fourteen variables into one Corporate Governance Index (CGI) and have shown that index is negatively related to equity capital cost. Higer CGI leads to lower equity cost because the central agency problem is slight and the interests of the minor shareholder could be less deprived by the controlling shareholder.