外部公司治理、盈餘管理與公司價值之關聯性—美國上市公司之實證研究

Abstract

會計財務資訊為投資大眾審慎判斷及決策制定之重要依據，且企業財務結構及經營現況亦是由管理當局所提供之財務報表呈現，然而管理當局可藉由一般公認會計原則所賦予的應計基礎下之彈性，在特定範圍內進行會計資訊之窗飾，故當企業面臨財務危機或高階經理者興起掏空公司之歹念時，管理當局可藉由盈餘管理而美化財務報表，進而欺騙資訊不對稱下之投資者，此類似案件不勝枚舉。此外，發生財務醜聞之企業，其公司治理機制未能發揮應有之監督功能也是造成財務弊案發生的重要因素。 本研究利用Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003)所建構G-index之外部公司治理變數、The Modified Jones Model (1995)之盈餘管理變數以及Tobin’s Q作為公司價值變數，探討外部公司治理、盈餘管理以及公司價值之關聯性，以1998~2003年美國上市公司為研究樣本。實證結果顯示，外部公司治理不佳將會導致盈餘管理程度提高，進一步降低公司價值。

Financial accounting information is the basis for the investors to make further investment decision. The corporation’s financial structure and its management also can be revealed by its financial reports. The management of the company use to the right which The GAAP gives the flexibility of accrual basis to manager to embellish accounting information. Hence, the manager can decorate financial report by earnings management when the enterprises facing the financial crisis or manager wants to hollow out company’s assets. And due to the asymmetric information, the investors were being cheated. For those enterprises with scandals, the corporate governance mechanism didn’t function well to supervise it. That is the important factor for those financial scandals happened.

This paper employs the G-index as a proxy for external corporation governance (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003) and earnings management that are structured by The Modified Jones Model (1995) and the Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value to discuss the relationship among them. The sample is the U.S. listed company from 1998 to 2003. The empirical results indicate the worse external corporation governance will increase degree of earnings management and decrease firm value.