獨立董監事兼職數之決定因素及對公司績效的影響—以上市櫃電子業為例

Abstract

為了健全公司治理制度與國際接軌，以提升競爭力，證交法於2006年修正並公佈條文，規定主管機關應視公司規模、股東結構、業務性質及其他必要情況要求其設置獨立董事，人數不得少於二人，且不得少於董事席次五分之一。而為了避免影響獨立董事執行職務的品質，規定公開發行公司之獨立董事兼任其他公開發行公司獨立董事不得超過三家。

本研究主要探討影響獨立董監事任職數的因素，以及獨立董監事是否會因本身兼任太多其他公司董監席次，限制了其時間及心力而難以專注於一家公司上，導致無法有效監督經營團隊。研究對象為台灣上市櫃電子業，研究期間為2003年至2005年，至少設立一名獨立董事及獨立監察人者。實證結果發現： 一、 獨立董監事為其他公司總經理、具財會、商務背景、學歷在碩博士以上、平 均公司規模皆與其是否忙碌呈正相關，公司過去平均績效與其是否忙碌呈負 相關。 二、 獨立董監事兼任情形與公司績效呈負相關。 三、 獨立董監事兼任過多會加深監察人內部化對公司績效的負面影響 四、 獨立董監事兼任過多會加深經理人涉入董事會對公司績效的負面影響 五、 獨立董監事兼任過多會加深控制股東控制權偏離盈餘權對公司績效的負面影響

In 2006, in order to improve the corporate governance systems and enhance its market competitive capabilities, The Security Exchange Commission (TSEC) decreed that for publicly listed companies, the Board of Directors should have at least two independent directors and can not hold less than 1/3 of the total directorships. To avoid worsening the quality of supervising, TSEC stipulated that the independent directors should not hold more than three independent directorships of other publicly listed companies.

The main purpose of this study is to explore the determinants of the directorships held by independent directors and the relation between the firm performance and directorships held by independent directors. In this study, the sample is the electronic industry with at least one independent director and one independent supervisor in the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporate (TSEC) and Over-the-Counter market (OTC) from 2003 to 2005. Our empirical results show:

1. Independent directors with the qualification of experts ,masters or top managers in other companies and average firm size are significantly positively associated with the number of directorships they hold. Average past performance of the firms for which independent directors serve is significantly negatively associated with the number of directorships they hold.

2. The existence of a majority of busy independent directors is significantly negatively associated with firm performance.

3. The existence of a majority of busy independent directors worsens the negative effect of non-independent of supervisor on firm performance.

4. The existence of a majority of busy independent directors worsens the negative effect of powerful managers on firm performance.

5. The existence of a majority of busy independent directors worsens the negative effect of the deviation of controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights from voting rights on firm performance.