非審計服務、會計師更換對會計師獨立性之影響

Abstract

本研究的主要目的在探討會計師同時提供審計及非審計服務、更換會計師及審計公費之削價競爭、股權集中度對會計師出具查核意見的影響，進而探討與會計師獨立性之關聯。本研究實證結果發現，非審計公費比率重大之公司，會計師傾向出具標準式無保留意見；而高信用風險之公司，若會計師對審計客戶提供非審計服務且金額比率重大者，相較没有提供者，較不容易出具非標準式無保留意見。換言之，會計師對審計客戶提供非審計服務水準愈高時，會計師會因經濟上之依賴，而較傾向出具對客戶較有利之查核意見，進而使其獨立性受損。本研究也發現非標準式無保留意見與更換會計師息息相關，即收到非標準式無保留意見之公司傾向更換會計師；而財務危機或信用風險高之公司，其中没有更換會計師較有更換者，更不容易收到會計師出具之非標準式無保留意見。內部人、董監、大股東持股越集中，會計師愈不會出具非標準式無保留意見。顯見會計師因「經濟依賴」較可能對其獨立性做出讓步，進而使其獨立性受損。

This study aims to explore how the audit opinion would be influenced by auditors’ joint provisions of the audit and non-audit services, auditor switching, the price war in the audit fees and concentration of directors’ shareholdings. The relation between the influence and the independence of auditor will be further discussed. The evidence indicates that auditors prefer to provide standard unqualified audit reports for companies with higher ratio of non-audit fees, greater insider ownership. Auditors provide standard unqualified opinions when there is non-audit service provided, because the auditors might benefit from the company according to the factor of economic. The research has also discovered that qualified audit report and auditor switching is closely linked. It implies that companies which received the qualification opinion intend to switch auditors. The results suggest that the independence of auditors is harmed through auditor non-audit fees and auditor consecutive engagement.