從代理理論的角度探討董事會特性、股權結構與負債之關聯性

Abstract

本文從代理問題的角度，檢視董事會特性及股權結構與負債之關聯性，同時探討負債、內部人持股、機構人持股與股利政策等監督機制之替代效果，並進一步驗證集團與非集團企業之差異性。以上市公司為對象，資料從1995到2001年，透過聯立模型以3SLS實證發現：(1)內部人持股、機構人持股與負債間互呈顯著正相關，符合管理據守、利益衝突與策略合力假說；其他股權結構、董事會特性變數與負債間則多不顯著，顯示國內公司治理尚有很大的進步空間。(2)股利與負債政策間互呈顯著負相關，兩者為替代的監督機制。(3)集團與非集團樣本可能因融資方式與條件不同，而有不同的融資考量。

The purposes of this paper are to examine the impact of board characteristics and ownership structure on debt, to verify the substitution effects among debts, insider ownership, institutional ownership and dividends, and to discuss the differences in debt determination between business groups and non-groups. We collected data from listed firms between 1995 and 2001. The 3SLS results showed insignificant with all board characteristics and some ownership variables. It implies that (1) corporate governance couldn't function effectively in Taiwan; (2) both insider and institutional ownership had positive effects on debt, and vice versa. It was consistent with the management entrenchment, conflict of interest and strategic alignment hypotheses. However, debt had monitoring substitution effects for dividends. Business groups and non-groups differed in debt determinations due to their different financing practices.